Missing Voices

Broadening the discussion on men, women, and ministry

Inside:
Continuing the conversation on κεφαλή
Further insights into οὐδὲ in 1 Timothy 2:12
... and more
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Listening to the Living Truth
Hilary Ritchie

When I was in college, I had many peers whose views differed from my own. One of my classmates (a complementarian) asked me to get coffee with him to discuss my views on gender. I got the sense that he had been wanting to discuss this issue for a long time, but didn’t know who he could ask. Indeed, when we met together, he began by thanking me for meeting with him, “Whenever I want to discuss this issue with anyone, they either get defensive or aggressive. But I just want to know your thoughts, and I don’t think you are one to start a fight.” I thanked him for the invitation and agreed that I had no intention of starting a fight or attempting to convince him of my position.

I explained my opinions on the matter, and he said very little as I talked. He simply listened and asked questions, not to provoke but to clarify. I felt heard and respected, and he was able to listen to a personal explanation of egalitarian beliefs without being distracted by vituperative accusations.

Listening is a way that we can be the hands, feet, and ears of Jesus. True listening happens infrequently, and, as I experienced, can result in one of those moments when we find ourselves unexpectedly refreshed.

The Christian Scholar

All this is well and good when we are encountering a friend at a coffee shop, a clerk at a grocery store, or a pastor on a Sunday morning. But what function does listening have in the life of the Christian scholar? The Christian scholar, among other things, ought to be a well-practiced listener and persistent truth-seeker.

These two ambitions (truth-seeking and listening) must be seen as complementary, not contradictory. Often, listening is seen as an activity that negates conviction—that somehow, by listening to those whose perspectives differ from our own, we lessen the importance of our own beliefs. Such a mindset suggests that when we avoid listening to those different from us, we are operating out of fear. We see our faith as something that we have to defend against falsehood, rather than something that God himself defends. Therefore, trust must undergird all of our dialogue—trust that God will make his truth known. Trust in God allows us to listen freely, a necessity in the pluralistic world we live in today.

The Living Truth

Since the Enlightenment, the pursuit of truth has often meant the categorization of knowledge into easily accessible structures. Even in the twenty-first century, we have not outgrown this desire—Google may simply be a contemporary version of Diderot’s Encyclopédie. Such categorization is not inherently opposed to truth-seeking. We can make a crucial mistake, however, when we have our attentions so fixed on our field of study that we forget that Jesus is the ultimate author and sustainer of all of our work. After all, Jesus is the truth (John 14:6), which is to say that the Truth is living. What makes Living Truth so difficult for us to grasp is that it often defies the human categories that we are so used to seeking. Therefore, we must continually be listening, because the Living Truth may often speak to us through the other. We ought not to be surprised when God uses human vehicles to challenge our presuppositions.

Take, for example, the reaction of Ananias when he heard of the conversion of Paul. God came to Ananias and told him outright to visit Paul, who was then called Saul and had been blinded on the Damascus road. This command from God ran counter to everything that Ananias believed to be true about Saul. Indeed, Ananias responds, “Lord, I have heard from many about this man, how much evil he has done to your saints in Jerusalem” (Acts 9:13). But God shifts his perspective and a few verses later, Ananias calls him “Brother Saul” (Acts 9:17). Paul’s vision returned and he received the Holy Spirit—all because Ananias was willing to listen and trust that God’s words were true.

A New Perspective

The problem with seeking Jesus is that he may turn what we consider to be truth on its head. We end up finding that the “truth” was really just human reasoning, brought to nothing in the presence of God (1 Cor. 1:27). As Christians, then, we can seek truth with open hands instead of tensing up and censoring that which makes us uncomfortable. An open posture exposes us to the possibility of genuinely listening to others, for Christ may be speaking truth to us through the most unlikely sources.

Of course, not all viewpoints can be accepted wholeheartedly. After truly listening, we must discern whether or not a new perspective is valid, using Scripture as our guide. Listening to Christ as we read the Bible, we can evaluate what we heard based on God’s words and action in Scripture. Then we can invite the opinions of wise and trusted brothers and sisters in the body of Christ and ask them and ourselves, “Do I look more like Christ now than I did before? Am I more loving, more grace-filled, more ardent in faith and desire to know God?” If the answer to those questions is yes, then it’s likely that Christ has you on his way, guiding you by truth to his everlasting life.

As a Christian scholarly community zealously seeking Truth, we must persevere in genuine listening. The first step in this process is to simply provide a space wherein all voices committed to Christ and the pursuit of Truth may be heard. This journal is one such space. Listen carefully.

Hilary Ritchie graduated from Bethel University with a degree in history and biblical and theological studies. She is interested in the early church, historical theology, and worship. She is currently pursuing her MDiv at Princeton Theological Seminary.
On the Significance of Κεφαλή (Head)
A Study of the Abuse of One Greek Word
Richard S. Cervin

There has been, and continues to be, a great deal of confusion, consternation, and perhaps grief, over the meaning of the Greek word κεφαλή (head) in the New Testament. Some claim that the word means “source;” others claim that it means “authority over;” still others have different ideas regarding the meaning of this Greek word. A great deal of ink has been spilled defending this or that position while attacking the others, and yet the debate continues. There are many issues related to the understanding of words in general (semantics), and to are many issues related to the understanding of words in general (semantics), and in particular, that have either been ignored, downplayed, or misconstrued by various proponents of the meaning of κεφαλή in the New Testament. Essentially, traditionalists argue that κεφαλή means “authority over” whereas egalitarians argue that the meaning of this Greek word is “source.” Authors on both sides of this debate have committed errors in the form of arguments used, in the method of semantic analysis, as well as in the citation of their primary Greek sources. In this article, I will review some general principles of semantic analysis and some other related background issues which bear on the meaning of κεφαλή in the New Testament. I will also discuss how the Septuagint (the translation of the Hebrew Old Testament into Greek in the third to second centuries BC) and some other Greek authors (notably Plato, Plutarch, and Philo) have been misappropriated in the discussion of κεφαλή. Because there are so many various passages in Greek literature which have been invoked as “proof” for this or that side in the debate, I cannot possibly review them all. Rather, I have selected only certain passages for discussion in order to illustrate the points I wish to make.

1. Issues pertaining to methodology

It is widely understood by linguists, lexicographers, and philosophers that words do not have one and only one meaning; they have several meanings, some of them quite distinct. Words have a variety of denotations (things they represent) as well as connotations (implied or associated meanings). One of the many problems that are characteristic of some of the studies about κεφαλή in the New Testament is that some modern authors have confused possible or proposed connotations with denotations. Some claim that “source” is the primary denotation of κεφαλή; others that “ruler,” “leader,” or “authority over,” is primary. Let me illustrate the problem of denotations and connotations by discussing briefly the meanings of these words in English. It will naturally be easier for English speakers to understand my point in English rather than in Greek.

We may speak of God the creator as the source of the universe because he created the universe and everything in it; he is its originator. However, the English word “source” does not always connote origin or beginning. The source of a river is its surface beginning point and is not necessarily the same as its origin. A river’s actual origin may in fact be underground and miles away from its apparent source. Similarly, the sources I used in writing this article consist in the books and articles, both Greek and English, that I consulted, but they are not the origin of my ideas and thoughts on this topic. Also, the English words origin and beginning are not always equivalent. The origin of a book, movie, or play is not the same thing as its beginning.

Likewise, the English word leader does not ipso facto possess the connotation of authority although such a connotation may be present, or even required, in a given context. Also, the English words ruler and leader are not equivalent. In English, ruler carries the connotation of governing in a political sense, whereas leader need not carry such a connotation. The relationship between the two terms is partitive: all rulers are leaders, but not all leaders are rulers. Lead(er) may denote someone/thing who is first (e.g., with reference to a parade); or it may denote a guide (e.g., to lead the way through a forest); or it may denote a main or prominent part (e.g., a leading part in a play) or a prominent person who is foremost in a given field of expertise (e.g., Gordon D. Fee as a leading theologian). In none of these examples can the term lead(er) be replaced with rule(r). One does not rule through the forest; the leader of a parade is not its ruler; and Fee is not a ruling theologian. Choosing to translate κεφαλή into English as “source,” “originator,” “ruler,” “leader,” “chief,” “authority over,” or whatever, is potentially misleading in English because these English words are neither exact equivalents of each other nor of the word κεφαλή. These English words possess various connotations which may or may not be present in the Greek word κεφαλή. The danger here is alleging that an English connotation is necessarily present in the Greek word because that Greek word can be translated by a certain English word. Connotations often do not translate from one language to another.

Moreover, in the New Testament when Christ is called κεφαλή, the word is used as a metaphor: “A figure of speech in which a word or phrase that ordinarily designates one thing is used to designate another, thus making an implicit comparison.” This is important because some modern authors have disregarded the use of κεφαλή as a metaphor. In their zeal to “prove” that “source” or “authority” is a legitimate meaning of κεφαλή in extra-biblical Greek, some have provided citations of κεφαλή in other Greek authors where the actual use of κεφαλή is in fact literal, not metaphorical at all. One cannot prove that a metaphorical use of a word is legitimate by citing literal uses of that word. The English word chair is an interesting parallel. One the one hand, chair denotes the thing that you sit on; on the other hand, chair as a metaphor also denotes the “leader” (but not “ruler”) of a department or board (another metaphor). Chair is in fact an
abbreviated form of chairman, chairwoman, chairperson and is very common in English. Every college and university in the country has departments and every corporation has boards, and there is a designated chair (not the thing, but the person) for each one. Using a word such as chair (or κεφαλή) literally does not make it into a metaphor, which by definition is an extension of the literal use of a word.

Another problem that some modern writers have had in their discussions of κεφαλή is that they have disregarded the periods of Greek literature. Greek is a living language, and as with all languages, it has undergone considerable change over the centuries. Modern Greek is considerably different from ancient Greek. All languages change with respect to grammar, word forms, and meanings. In fact, there was considerable change even in ancient Greek. Thus, arguments which may appear significant or convincing to readers who have little or no grounding in ancient Greek literature are in fact either misleading at best or downright deceptive at worst. For this reason, one cannot simply lump “ancient Greek” together as a single entity, especially since the term “ancient Greek” covers a vast period of time, about 1,500 years. Languages change a great deal during such a time period, and Greek did as well. The Greek of Homer (eighth to ninth centuries BC) is considerably different from Plato’s (c. 429–347 BC) which is also very different from St. Paul’s (first century AD). One cannot therefore assume that a particular Greek word has the same meaning in the New Testament as it does in Homer or even in Plato (or any other author of a different time period), and yet such an assumption has been tacitly assumed by some modern authors regarding the meaning of κεφαλή.8

Modern Classics scholars have traditionally divided ancient Greek into the following general time periods:9

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<tr>
<td>Archaic</td>
<td>10th–5th centuries BC</td>
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<td>Classical</td>
<td>5th–4th centuries BC</td>
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<td>Hellenistic</td>
<td>4th–1st centuries BC</td>
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<td>Roman</td>
<td>1st century BC – 5th century AD</td>
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<td>Byzantine</td>
<td>5th–15th centuries AD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modern</td>
<td>15th century–present</td>
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These demarcations are modern conveniences, not hard and fast divisions of the language or the history of the Greeks.

Language change is always gradual. Plato (classical period) would certainly have been perfectly intelligible to Alexander the Great (Hellenistic period) because their lives overlapped; Plato was about 73 when Alexander was born and Alexander was about 9 when Plato died. Saint Paul, in the first century, would have had little trouble reading Plato (roughly analogous to our reading Shakespeare today, although that is becoming increasingly difficult for modern English speakers). However, St. Paul would have had considerable difficulty reading Homer (roughly analogous to our reading Chaucer).

Authorship is another important issue that must be considered. Various authors may use the same word in quite different ways. For example, the Greek word θεός (god) while always denoting supernatural beings in Greek, may encompass widely divergent ideas or connotations. Context is the deciding factor for determining what a given author means by using particular words in particular ways. For Homer, a polytheist, the θεοί (gods) are personal, supernatural beings who are quite active in human affairs. However, in Plato, who was also a polytheist, the θεοί are more abstract, philosophical constructs.10 On the other hand, for St. Paul, a monotheist, θεός (god) is the God of Israel, the God of the Old Testament, and in fact Jesus is God incarnate. Thus, Homer’s, Plato’s, and St. Paul’s understanding of the word θεός is quite distinct and these distinctions can be seen in the ways each author uses the word.

In the same way, authorship is also relevant in determining the connotation(s) of κεφαλή. It is simply misleading to imply, as some modern authors have done, that κεφαλή means the same, or nearly the same, thing in most Greek authors. The meaning of κεφαλή in Church Fathers such as Chrysostom (ca. AD 350–407), Athanasius (ca. AD 296–373), Basil (ca. AD 330–379) or any other writer more than two centuries after the New Testament is irrelevant in determining what κεφαλή meant to St. Paul in the first century AD. As I said earlier, languages change, and it is entirely possible that there was a shift in the connotation of κεφαλή after the NT, perhaps even because of it. In principle, to import Athanasius’ connotation of κεφαλή, or Plato’s, onto St. Paul would be as foolish as me addressing a group of men as girls because that is what Chaucer would have said. Whether or not there has in fact been any shift in the connotation, implication, or metaphorical extensions of κεφαλή is beyond the scope of this article. To the best of my knowledge, no historical study of the connotations and uses of κεφαλή has ever been done. Such a study would best be undertaken by classically trained lexicographers, not theologians.

2. On the meaning “source”

Catherine Clark Kroeger11 has argued that κεφαλή commonly meant “source” in ancient Greek. One of the major drawbacks of her article is that she mixes authors and time periods and that many of the authors she cites discuss either physiology (thus κεφαλή is used literally with reference to the head), or philosophical systems in which κεφαλή is often used literally as well.12 Other authors Kroeger cites lived after the NT period (second century AD or later) and are thus irrelevant to the discussion. Most of the authors cited by Kroeger do not in fact use the word κεφαλή as a metaphor for “source.” As far as I know, there are only two occurrences in pre-biblical Greek of the alleged use of κεφαλή as a metaphor for “source.” However, this notion is not at all firmly fixed in either passage. Following are the texts in question with a brief comment:13

1) The Orphic Fragment 21: Zeus is the beginning (ἀρχή), Zeus is the middle, and by Zeus everything is accomplished. Zeus is the foundation both of earth and of sparkling heaven.14

This is a fragment of a poem whose date is uncertain. It may be as early as the fifth century BC, although a great deal of Orphic literature is much later. The word κεφαλή does not occur in this fragment; however, there is a variant version of this poem, Fragment 21A, which does use κεφαλή in place of ἀρχή (beginning): “Zeus is the head, Zeus is the middle, ...” The use of “source” as a translation for ἀρχή may be misleading. ἀρχή is another Greek word which is fraught with ambiguity. The word means “1. beginning, origin; first principle or element; end, extremity; 2. first place or power, sovereignty; magisterial office.”15 What then is the best translation for the phrase, “Zeus is ἀρχή”? Out of context, all of the following are good translations: “Zeus is the beginning/origin/source/first

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principle/end/power/sovereignty.” All of these ideas are true of Zeus’s characteristics as understood by pagan Greeks. Which one is the best translation for the phrase in Orphic Fragment 21A? Due to the presence of the word μέσσα (middle) and the overall context, ἀρχή is best translated as “beginning.” Neither “source” nor “authority over” is relevant here. At best, the meaning of κεφαλή here is disputable, although it most likely means “starting-point” or “beginning.”¹⁶ The mere equation of κεφαλή = ἀρχή; ἀρχή = “source”; therefore, κεφαλή = “source” is both a logical and a semantic fallacy.

2) Herodotus’ Histories 4.91: The headsprings (κεφαλαί) of the Taurus give water that is the best and most beautiful of all rivers.¹⁷

Here, κεφαλαί (plural) appears to be a synonym of πηγαί (springs) and refers to the apparent source of the Taurus River. However, it is more likely that κεφαλή here in Herodotus connotes “either extremity of a linear object” because the word is used in Greek to refer also to the mouth of a river as well as its source.¹⁸ “Source” is a possible translation here for κεφαλή given the context because it is the proper English word to use, but κεφαλή is not here a metaphor for source.

Of other passages claimed to mean “source,” some are from Philo (to be discussed below) and others from the Oneirocriticon by Artemidorus Daldianus, a second century AD author, or from various Church Fathers. Because Daldianus and the Fathers are late, their use of κεφαλή is irrelevant to its meaning in the NT.

3. On the connotations of “prominence” or “preeminence”

There has been some objection to the connotations of prominence or preeminence as they apply to κεφαλή. Even though these English words are not found in Liddell-Scott-Jones’ Greek-English Lexicon (henceforth LSJ), they are used in other NT dictionaries. Thayer uses the word “prominent:” Metaph. anything supreme, chief, prominent; of persons, master, lord.”²¹ The word “prominent” is also used in the TDNT: “But this leads us to the second aspect, i.e., not merely what is first, or supreme, at the beginning or end, but also what is ‘prominent,’ ‘outstanding,’ or ‘determinative.’”²² Nida and Louw use the word “preeminent:” “one who is of supreme or pre-eminent status, in view of authority to order or command.”²³

Following is my rationale for claiming that “prominent” is a valid aspect of the meaning of κεφαλή. Grudem states that the notion of “authority over” is primary with respect to the meaning of κεφαλή, and that the notions of prominence or preeminence, if they are valid at all, are mere “overtones” of that metaphor. He further states that preeminence “without any nuance of leadership or authority” flies in the face of the facts.²⁴ However, I suggest that the opposite is the case. What is the distinction in English between “prominent” and “preeminent?” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines “prominent” as follows: “1. Projecting outward or upward from a line or surface; protuberant. 2. Immediately noticeable; conspicuous. 3. Widely known; eminent.” The same dictionary provides the following definition for “preeminent:” “Superior to or notable above all others; outstanding.” The notion of authority is absent from these definitions, but that is not to say that authority could not be present in a particular context. Contrary to Grudem, it is not the case that the notions of prominence and authority are intrinsically linked together. Things, as well as people, may have prominence without authority (e.g., the mass of entertainment celebrities in American culture who, while they do exert influence in our society, do not have any “authority over” our society). Also, authority may exist without prominence—the police forces in any given community, for example, do have authority within those communities, but they are not necessarily prominent parts of them. The same is true of the metaphorical use of the Greek word κεφαλή; “authority” is not a necessary entailment of the metaphor, but I suggest that “prominence” is.

I take the Greeks’ metaphorical use of κεφαλή to have a rather physical and vertical orientation. Just as the head is the topmost part of humans’ and animals’ physiology, and due to the fact that the head contains the organs of αἴσθησις (sense-perception), so the head is the most prominent part of our bodies. This notion of topiness/prominence was then projected onto other objects, such as trees, mountains, and waves where the top is the most prominent part, especially at a distance; thus the Greeks could speak of the head of a tree, of a mountain, or of a wave. Then if the vertical orientation is turned on its side, i.e. horizontally, the notion of κεφαλή can be applied to the ends of things, since the head is at one end of a body which is lying down. Other specific metaphorical uses of κεφαλή can then be derived by further extensions of this vertical/horizontal orientation; e.g. Herodotus could speak of the source of the Taurus river as being the heads (κεφαλαί) because the beginning of a river is one end of a line, so to speak.²⁵

One may wonder what the difference between “prominence” and LSJ’s definition of “end, extremity” is. The difference is partitive, i.e., that “prominence” includes “extremity” (prominent parts are also ends of things), but “extremity” does not include “prominence” (not every end point is prominent), e.g., the “head” of a mountain or of a person’s body is not merely its “end point,” but is also its prominent end. I think that this explanation of the metaphorical use of κεφαλή is superior both to LSJ’s definition based on “end point,” and to Grudem’s suggestion that “authority” is the “primary meaning.” The top of a mountain, or the sources of the Taurus River do not possess authority over the mountain or river itself; “authority over” is not even relevant in this regard, but “prominence” is.

4. On κεφάλαιον (sum, total) as a supporting argument

In support of his contention that κεφαλή is a common metaphor for authority in Greek, Grudem has suggested an argument based upon semantic change. He notes that the noun κεφάλαιον does denote a personal metaphor (LSJ: “of persons, the head or chief” “in an earlier period” of the Greek language; that the noun κεφάλαιον may not have functioned in that capacity in classical Greek; and he suggests that there may have been a semantic shift whereby κεφαλή took on the sense of κεφάλαιον as a personal metaphor by the New Testament period.²⁶ As persuasive as his argument may appear to those who have not studied the Greek language, it is dead wrong, and is entirely misleading.

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to anyone who does not have a background in classical Greek language and literature. First of all, the noun κεφάλαιον means "chief or main point, sum, total" and is never used of persons as a metaphor for authority in Greek literature until the fourth century AD. Under the entry in LSJ for κεφάλαιον referring to persons as the "head" or "chief," there are nine citations from five authors, but only two of those authors antedate the NT: Eupolis (fifth century BC) and Menander (ca. 344–392 BC). The other three authors lived after the NT was written and so their use of κεφάλαιον is irrelevant as supporting evidence for any alleged semantic change which occurred before the NT period.27

Eupolis was a comic poet of the classical period whose writings survive only in fragments. The relevant passage is actually quoted by Plutarch (ca. AD 50–120) in his Pericles. It was common knowledge to Greeks that Pericles, a Greek statesman (ca. 495–429 BC), had an abnormally shaped head, and Plutarch quotes several of the quips and gibes that various comic poets had made regarding Pericles’s odd-shaped head. The last quote Plutarch includes is the following from Eupolis:

And Eupolis, in his "Demes," having inquiries made about each of the demagogues as they come up from Hades, says, when Pericles is called out last:—"The very head (κεφάλαιον) of those below hast thou now brought." (Pericles 3.3–4).28

It is clear from this context in Plutarch (and this is the only context in extant Greek literature where this fragment occurs) that this use of κεφάλαιον by Eupolis is a joke on Pericles’s anatomy and was never intended to be taken as a serious metaphor denoting a leader. Eupolis does not in fact call Pericles the κεφάλαιον of Athens, nor does Plutarch.

The only other pre-NT occurrence of κεφάλαιον which LSJ cite is from Menander, another comic playwright (ca. 342–293 BC). The word occurs in the play Ἀρχάγγελοι (The Girl Who Gets Her Hair Cut Short) and involves a love triangle. Both the soldier Polemon and Moskhion love Glykera. In the relevant scene, Polemon, who is temporarily away, sends his slave Sosias to check up on Glykera who had recently moved into Moskhion’s household. Daos, Moskhion’s slave, sees Sosias enter the scene and exclaims:

The hireling has arrived, [i.e., Sosias]. A sorry state of things Is this, yes, by Apollo absolutely so.
Not even yet I reckon in what’s chief (κεφάλαιον) of all:
If from the country soon his master [i.e. Polemon] comes again;
How great confusion he will cause when he turns up.29

The κεφάλαιον in this context is the “chief” or “main” difficulty of the situation and refers to “the master,” Polemon, should he return unexpectedly. While the noun κεφάλαιον does refer to the master, it is not a metaphor for “ruler, one with authority over,” but rather refers to the master (Polemon) as the main or chief cause of the difficulties which are about to explode in the play when he discovers that his girlfriend is living in his rival’s household.

All the other occurrences cited by LSJ (Lucian of Samosata, a satirist; Appian, a historian; and the Emperor Julianus) occur after the NT was written, and so it is nonsense to use these authors to argue that a semantic shift had occurred prior to the writing of the NT. Thus, Grudem’s argument that there has been a semantic shift in the meaning of κεφαλή based upon the prior use of κεφάλαιον is groundless.

5. Plato

In classical Greek, there is only one passage wherein κεφαλή is alleged to mean “authority over.”31 This passage is found in Plato’s Timaeus 44d.32 Due to the nature of this particular passage with respect to Plato’s philosophy, and also due to the fact that Plato yielded immense influence among later philosophers (both Plutarch and Philo, to be discussed later, were Platonists), this passage needs to be discussed.

In the Timaeus, Plato details his version of the creation of the universe. Regarding the universe, we are told that soul was created before body and was given precedence and rule over body (34c); that soul is the best part of creation, which partakes of reason and virtue (36e–37a). We are also told that the sphere is the intrinsically perfect and uniform shape, and hence was chosen by the creator to be the shape of the universe (33b). The creator then modeled the divine form after the sphere (40a–b). It is clear from the Timaeus that Plato believed the spherical shape to reflect the epitome of divinity and perfection. After the creator created the universe and the lesser gods, he told them to fashion mortal creatures by using the structure of the universe as a blueprint (41a–d).

The gods then linked the best part of creation, the soul, to the best shape, the sphere, made the sphere a head, and they then created the body to go with the head so as to provide it with the means for movement within the physical world (44d–45a). Our sensory organs were then created so that we may experience the physical world in which we live and thereby gain knowledge by means of philosophy (47a–d).

While it is true that Plato speaks of the spherical body, i.e. the head, as the most divine and ruling part (44d), a few lines later he speaks of our body which carries at its top the receptacle of our most divine and holy part which is the soul (45a). The relevant passage in Timaeus 44d is as follows:

"Copying the revolving shape of the universe, the gods bound the two divine orbits into a ball-shaped body, the part that we now call our head (κεφαλή). This is the most divine part of us, and master of all our other parts. They then assembled the rest of the body and handed the whole of it to the head, to be in its service."

In Plato’s overall philosophy, it is not the head (κεφαλή) that is the governor or ruler, but rather it is the soul (ψυχή). Soul governs the entire universe (Phaedrus 246c), is the only thing capable of intelligence (Timaeus 46d), and is immortal (Phaedrus 245c–e; Republic 608c–612a; see also the Phaedo). In his Phaedrus, Plato employs an analogy of a charioteer in order to describe the soul. Plato says that the soul is the “ruling power” (ἄρχων) which drives the chariot, the two horses of which typify our good and bad qualities (Phaedrus 246a–b).

Plato further states that the mind or intellect (νοῦς) is the governor of the soul (Phaedrus 247c–d). Elsewhere, Plato explains his doctrine that the soul has three parts: reason, desire, and spirit or passion (Republic 435–442, 580d–581c; see also the Timaeus 69–73 where greater attention is given to physiological details within the scope of Plato’s philosophy).

For Plato, it is clear that the soul, rather than the head itself, is the best, most divine, most holy aspect of our being; and reason, which he locates in the head of the mortal body, rules the soul. Thus, this passage in the Timaeus can only be fully understood in the light of Plato’s overall teaching of the soul. This is a far cry from either using the word

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κεφαλή as a personal metaphor for “ruler” or “leader” or from understanding it as such. Nowhere does Plato ever use κεφαλή as a personal metaphor for “ruler” or “leader.” In fact, there are so far no clear and unambiguous instances in native Greek literature before the NT where κεφαλή (or κεφάλαιον, as was noted earlier) is so used. It is not a native Greek metaphor. The use of κεφαλή as a personal metaphor for “ruler” or “leader” first appears in the Septuagint (discussed below) and then only a relatively few times. If this metaphor is allegedly so common in the classical or Hellenistic periods before the NT, why are there no clear examples of it in the native literature of those periods?

6. Where in the body does the mind reside?

There has been some disagreement regarding the locus of the controlling part of the body in Greek literature; some modern writers claim that it was in the head (hence, “authority” is readily understandable), others in the heart, κεφάλια (thus, by implication, divorcing “authority” from the head).35 However, the fact of the matter is that both views were widely held in the ancient world. Plato located intelligence and reason in the heart.36 Aristotle, on the other hand, located reason in the heart.37 Both Plato and Aristotle were highly influential philosophers. The Jewish Neo-Platonist philosopher Philo (1st century AD), interestingly enough, states quite clearly that both views were advocated by location or nomenclature but by their function and their proportion must be scrutinized.38 However, the fact of the matter is that both views were widely held in the ancient world. Plato located intelligence and reason in the heart.35 Aristotle, on the other hand, located reason in the heart.37 Both Plato and Aristotle were highly influential philosophers. The Jewish Neo-Platonist philosopher Philo (1st century AD), interestingly enough, states quite clearly that both views were held. Note that the word κεφαλή in the following passage is used literally, not metaphorically:

And where in the body has the mind (νοῦς) made its lair? Has it had a dwelling assigned to it? Some have regarded the head (κεφαλή), our body’s citadel, as its hallowed shrine, since it is about the head that the senses have their station, and it seems natural to them that they should be posted there, like bodyguards to some mighty monarch. Others contend pertinaciously for their conviction that the heart (κεφάλια) is the shrine in which it is carried (On Dreams 1.32).39

Philo apparently remained somewhat uncommitted in his own view, for on at least three occasions he refers to the “ruling principle” or “mind” as residing in either heart or brain (The Sacrifices of Abel and Cain 136, The Worse Attacks the Better 90, and On the Posternity and Exile of Cain 137), and in his Allegorical Interpretation (I.62) he makes the uncommitted statement that the ruling part of the soul is located in the body.

The Platonist philosopher Plutarch (ca. AD 50–120) rejected the notion that the parts of the soul could be naively placed in various parts of the body: “Or is it ridiculous to allot to local positions the status of first and intermediate and last… so the parts of the soul must not be constrained by location or nomenclature but by their function and their proportion must be scrutinized.”37 Later still, the Skeptic philosopher Sextus Empiricus (second century AD) also acknowledges philosophers’ lack of agreement: “For we see certain fluids belonging to each of the regions in which the doctrinaire thinkers believe that the commanding-faculty is located—be it the brain, the heart, or whatever part of the animal one may care to put it in.”38

As for Paul, his ideas on this subject must be derived from his usage of κεφαλία. From some translations of passages such as Rom. 1:2139 (“... and their senseless minds (κεφαλία) were darkened” [RSV]) and 2 Cor. 9:740 (“Each of you must do as he has made up his mind (κεφαλία) ...” [RSV]), it would appear that Paul held to the Aristotelian view. For an ancient Greek, the matter would boil down to one’s philosophical allegiance, whether one is a Platonist, an Aristotelian, a Stoic, etc. Therefore, this issue is of no real value in determining the implied meaning(s) of κεφαλή in the NT.

7. The Septuagint (LXX)

The first clear occurrence in the Greek language of κεφαλή as a personal metaphor for “leader” is in the Septuagint (henceforth LXX), the translation of the Hebrew Old Testament into Greek in the third to second centuries BC. The LXX has been invoked both as undermining the notion that κεφαλή means “authority over”41 as well as supporting that notion.42 The arguments basically run as follows: the Hebrew word for head is שׁ and is also used as a personal metaphor for leaders and for those in authority. Of the approximately 180 occurrences of שׁ denoting “leader” in the OT, the translators of the LXX rendered most of them into Greek as ἀρχων (leader) or some other term denoting leaders, but not typically as κεφαλή. In fact, κεφαλή is only used in the LXX for שׁ 8 times. Such a practice clearly shows that the LXX translators understood that κεφαλή does not entail authority, otherwise they would have used it more often. Not so, says the other camp. שׁ is translated as κεφαλή 16 times, not 8. Such a practice clearly shows that κεφαλή is a common and viable metaphor for “leader” in Greek. Grudem states “what it actually means to have sixteen (or even eight) instances of a term used in a certain sense in the Septuagint. It is really a rich abundance of examples.”43

What are we to say to these arguments, and to the fact that different numbers are invoked regarding the occurrences of κεφαλή = שׁ = “leader” (8 versus 16)? There are several problems with using the LXX as evidence for the meanings of Greek words in general, and of κεφαλή in particular. First of all, simply counting words can be a problem. There are two modern critical editions of the LXX—Cambridge’s and Göttingen’s (edited by Alfred Rahlfs)—the latter readily available from the United Bible Society. These editions are not identical. Also, there are thousands of variant readings among the many manuscripts which were used to produce these editions; hence many words such as κεφαλή will occur both in the main text as well as in the critical apparatus. In addition, in English translations of the Bible, the word “head” may be used in a given passage where the Greek word κεφαλή does not occur in the LXX. Grudem ran into this problem a couple of times in his original article.44 Furthermore, scholars may not always agree on the exact connotation of a given word in a given context. Thus, the existence of various manuscript readings, various editions, and various translations all result in counting procedures being rather fuzzy.

Secondly, the LXX is a translation, not an original Greek composition, and therefore runs the risk of Hebraic influence. There are many cases of overt semantic and syntactic contamination in the LXX (i.e., the words may be Greek, but the meaning or syntactic construction is Hebrew). Indeed, J. A. L. Lee states, “The language of the LXX is plainly not normal Greek in many places.”45 Lee also states, with good reason, that one “cannot make the bald assumption that ‘the
LXX made sense to Hellenistic Jews,”46 It is for this reason that the LXX is potentially a “biased witness,” as it were. Thus, the LXX is not a primary Greek witness to the meaning of κεφαλή in this regard because it is a translation. Its value must be regarded as secondary, and at every point abnormalities of any kind (syntactic or semantic) must be weighed against the possibility of Hebrew influence. It is entirely possible that the relatively few occurrences of κεφαλή = ἄρχον = “leader” (8–16 out of 180 = 4–8%) is due to an occasional literalistic translation.47 This would explain why κεφαλή occurs so infrequently as a translation of the metaphor ἄρχει = “leader.”

On the other hand, if we assume that κεφαλή were a common and prevalent Greek metaphor for “leader,” then that same well-established Hebrew metaphor (נַחֲלָה = “leader”) should be perfectly transferrable into Greek and we should expect a nearly 100% translation rate: ἄρχει = κεφαλή (leader). However, this has simply not occurred. It strikes me as very odd that the translators of the LXX would choose to disregard a metaphor which is allegedly perfectly translatable from Hebrew to Greek, especially in light of the many literalist, and sometimes un-Greek, translations which were foisted on the Greek text of the LXX elsewhere. Those who argue for “authority” have not adequately explained this problem.

Third, there is the problem of the proper weight and value to be assigned to variant readings. Egalitarians tend to dismiss those passages in the LXX which have variations whereas traditionalists tend to include them; hence, the competing claims of 8 versus 16 occurrences of κεφαλή (leader) in the LXX. The arguments on this point from both sides are misleading. To the best of my knowledge, there are four passages which contain variant readings with κεφαλή:48

1) Judges 10:18: 49 “And each of the leaders (αἱ ἄρχοντες) of Gilead said to his neighbor, ‘Who is the man who will begin the fight against the sons of Ammon? He shall indeed be head (A: εἰς κεφαλήν; B: εἰς ἄρχοντα) over all the inhabitants of Gilead.’”

The manuscript Alexandrinus (A) reads “as head” while Vaticanus (B) reads “as leader.”

2) Judges 11:8–9, 1150 (OSB 11:7–8, 10): “And the elders of Gilead said to Jephthah, ‘That is why we have turned against you now, that you may go with us and fight against the sons of Ammon, and be our head (A: εἰς κεφαλήν; B: εἰς ἄρχοντα) over all the inhabitants of Gilead.’ So Jephthah said to the elders of Gilead, ‘If you take me back home to fight against the sons of Ammon, and the Lord delivers them to me, I shall indeed be your head (A: εἰς κεφαλήν; B: εἰς ἄρχοντα).’ Then Jephthah went with the elders of Gilead, and the people made him head and commander (A: εἰς κεφαλήν καὶ εἰς ἄρχοντα) over them; and Jephthah spoke all his words before the Lord in Mizpah.”

The same variation appears here again. The last example (v. 11/10) is interesting in that the phrase “head and commander” is slightly different. Literally, A reads “as head as commander” while B reads “as head and as leader.” The additional phrases εἰς ἄρχοντα καὶ εἰς ἄρχοντα clarify the overall meaning of this text.

3) 3 Kingdoms (1 Kings) 8:151 the LXX text reads: “Twenty years later, when Solomon finished building the house of the Lord and his own house, King Solomon assembled all the elders of Israel in Zion, to bring up the ark of the covenant of the Lord from of the city of David, which is Zion.” Note that the word head (κεφαλή) does not even occur. However, the RSV reads in part, “Then Solomon assembled the elders of Israel and all the heads of the tribes ...” The phrase “heads (κεφαλάς) of the tribes” is relegated to the apparatus in Rahlf’s text and attributed to Origen’s edition of the LXX.

4) Isaiah 7:8–9,52 “But the head (κεφαλή) of Syria is Damascus [and the head of Damascus is Rezin]; nevertheless, in sixty-five years the kingdom of Ephraim will cease being a people. Also the head (κεφαλή) of Ephraim is Samaria, and the head (κεφαλή) of Samaria is Remaliah’s son.”

In this passage, the word “head” occurs four times in English, but the Greek word κεφαλή occurs only three times in Rahlf’s edition. The section in square brackets is not printed in the LXX text, but is in the apparatus with unnamed manuscripts either deleting or including the phrase.

What is to be made of these variant passages? What did the translator(s) actually translate? What did the scribes actually copy? Which readings are original? The only way to get firm, definitive answers to these questions is to ask the translators and/or scribes themselves, but they are all long dead, so that is out of the question. Modern scholars often attempt to resolve such impossible questions by positing various scenarios to explain away one reading or the other. For example, let’s suppose that κεφαλή were original; how then could ἄρχον be substituted? Answer: perhaps some scribe thought that the translation was not literal enough and so changed ἄρχον to κεφαλή. Another tactic sometimes employed by modern scholars is to play favorites with the manuscripts (A is “better” than B, so we’ll adopt A’s reading). Modern textual critics’ reasons for adopting this or that reading are often speculative. The unfortunate fact is that we cannot ever know for certain which reading was original. Therefore, at the very least, such examples should be deemed textually uncertain and should not be blindly invoked as solid examples as if there were no problems associated with them.

There are two other passages in the LXX which have been misappropriated in support of κεφαλή as “authority over.”53 These passages are characterized by a head-tail metaphor (hence the Greek translations of κεφαλή “head” and ὀδόα “tail”). Because of the nature of this head-tail metaphor, any translation other than κεφαλή would render these passages incoherent.54

1) Deut. 28:12b–13, 43–4455 “You shall lend to many nations, but you shall not borrow; and you shall rule over many nations, and they shall not rule over you. So the Lord your God will make you the head (κεφαλή) and not the tail; you shall be above only and not beneath, if you heed the commandments of the Lord your God I command you today to keep and do them ... The resident alien among you shall rise higher and higher above you, and you shall come down lower and lower. He shall lend to you, but you shall not lend to him; he shall be the head (κεφαλή), and you shall be the tail.”

In these verses, the point is borrowing money, not ruling the nations. One need not borrow money from one’s ruler, although one must necessarily borrow from those of higher
economic status (which may of course include one’s ruler). Furthermore, the head-tail metaphor is juxtaposed to statements regarding “top-bottom” or “higher-lower.” The entire chapter of Deuteronomy 28 speaks of the blessings or curses which God will send upon Israel depending on their obedience or disobedience. The chapter opens with the statement: “...if you diligently obey the voice of the Lord your God to be careful to do all His commandments I command you today, then the Lord your God will set you high over all the nations of the earth” (vs. 1, OSB). The point of the chapter revolves around the blessings of material prosperity and the curses of material deprivation. Prominence is surely a valid issue here. If Israel obeys, they will be a prominent nation in the world; if they disobey, they will be humiliated. While leadership in world affairs often follows economic and social prosperity (but is not necessary), nowhere in the text of Deuteronomy 28 does it expressly say that Israel will “rule” other nations; rather, material prosperity is reiterated in many ways. Authority is not a necessary entailment of the use of κεφαλή in this passage.

2) Isaiah 9:14–16:56 “So the LORD cut off from Israel head and tail, palm branch and reed in one day—the elder and honored man is the head, and the prophet who teaches lies is the tail; for those who lead this people lead them astray, and those who are led by them are swallowed up” (RSV).

The LXX version (verses 13–14) of this passage is interesting: “So the Lord took away head (κεφαλή) and tail from Israel, great and small, in one day. The elder and those who admire persons, this is the head (ἀρχή). The prophet who teaches lawlessness, this is the tail” (OSB). In this particular passage, the word κεφαλή is used only once, yet the notion of authority is clearly stated by the use of the Greek word ἀρχή. Furthermore, it is clear that Isaiah identifies both “head” and “tail” with those in authority, the “head” being the elders and the “tail” being the lying prophets. “Authority” is thus derived from the context and the additional use of the word ἀρχή, and not merely from the word κεφαλή itself.

This leaves four LXX passages which are textually firm (no variant readings) and wherein the connotation of authority is reasonably understood:57

i) 2 Kingdoms (2 Samuel) 22:44,45 “You will deliver me from the quarrels of the people; you have kept me at the head (ἐξ οὗ κεφαλήν) of the nations. A people I have not known served me.”

ii) Psalm 17:44 (18:43);59 “Deliver me from the contradictions of the people; you will establish me as the head (ἐξ οὗ κεφαλήν) of the Gentiles; a people I never knew served me.”

iii) Jeremiah 38:7 (31:7);60 “For thus says the Lord to Jacob: Rejoice and exult in the Head (ἐπὶ κεφαλήν) of the nations. Make a proclamation and praise Him. Say, ‘The Lord saved His people, the remnant of Israel.’”

iv) Lamentations 1:5,61 “Her oppressors have become the master (ἐξ οὗ κεφαλήν), and her enemies prosper; For the Lord humbled her because of the greatness of her ingoddiness.”

Thus, the value of the Septuagint has been overrated as evidence for κεφαλή connoting “leader” or “authority.” The relatively few uses of κεφαλή as a metaphor for “leader” can best be explained as due to Hebrew influence. Furthermore, the connotation of “source” for κεφαλή in the LXX does not exist. It is simply inappropriate to the context of each passage mentioned here.

8. Philo62

Philo reiterates many of Plato’s ideas regarding the soul, and many of Philo’s statements regarding the soul are very similar, if not identical, to statements made by Plato in the Timaeus and elsewhere. For example, he refers to the “dominant” or “sovereign mind,” ὁ γεγένητο τοῦ νοῦ, (On Dreams 1.30, 44); and to the mind as being “holy” and as a “fragment of the Deity” (On Dreams 1.34); and he further says that “the Mind, the sovereign element of the soul ... evidently occupies a position in men precisely answering to that which the great Ruler occupies in all the world” (On the Creation 69; compare Who is the Heir 233: “In fact I regard the soul as being in man what the heaven is in the universe.”). There are many other similar statements throughout Philo’s writings. In assessing Philo’s use of κεφαλή, one must remember that Philo was a Neo-Platonist. One must question whether Philo is using κεφαλή literally or as a personal metaphor for “leader” or “ruler,” and whether his usage of κεφαλή has more to do with his Platonic notion of divine reason as the dominant or controlling part of the soul. Philo’s philosophical underpinnings can be clearly seen in two κεφαλή passages (On Dreams 2.207 and Moses 2.82). In both of these passages, κεφαλή denotes the literal head and is not a personal metaphor for “ruler,” “leader.”63

Much has been made of Philo’s use of κεφαλή in Moses 2.30 which allegedly denotes authority.64 In this passage, Philo extols the achievements of king Ptolemy II Philadelphos (ca. 308–246 BC). Here, Philadelphos is certainly a leader, but not in terms of being the ruler of the Ptolemaic dynasty, for the entire dynasty had nearly died out before Philo was born; rather Philadelphos is the leader in terms of being the best, the most prominent, the most influential of the Ptolemaic kings. This is entirely clear in the overall context of Moses 2.29–30. Note that κεφαλή is used but once despite the translation.65

Ptolemy, surnamed Philadelphus, was the third in succession to Alexander, the conqueror of Egypt. In all the qualities which make a good ruler, he excelled not only his contemporaries, but all who have arisen in the past and even till to-day, after so many generations, his praises are sung for the many evidences and monuments of his greatness of mind which he left behind him in different cities and countries, so that, even now, acts of more than ordinary munificence or buildings on a specially great scale are proverbially called Philadelphian after him. To put it shortly, as the house of the Ptolemies was highly distinguished, compared with other dynasties, so was Philadelphus among the Ptolemies. The creditable achievements of this one man almost outnumbered those of all the others put together, and, as the head (κεφαλή) takes the highest place in the living body, so he may be said to head the kings.66

Those who claim that the notions of “ruler” or “authority” over work in this context must explain how it is possible for one dead king to rule or exercise authority over other dead kings. There is in fact no notion of “authority” here; rather, this passage illustrates very well the notions of “prominence” or “preeminence” as described above.

On Mating with the Preliminary Studies 61 is another disputed passage about which both sides of this debate are confused:

And of all members of the clan here described Esau is the progenitor (γενάρχης), the head (κεφαλή) as it were of the
whole creature—Esau whose name we sometimes interpret as "an oak," sometimes as "a thing made up."67

Payne claims that θεομοιος in this passage denotes "source of life" but Grudem rejects this interpretation and maintains that "ruler, authority over" is relevant.68 Payne’s claim that Esau is the source of life of his clan is surely incorrect. The deceased Esau is not really the source of anything. Esau is merely the founder or progenitor of his clan, as Philo clearly states. θεομοιος here probably has the sense of "starting-point," referring to the fact that Esau is the beginning or founder of the Edomites, rather than "source of life."69 Esau will always be the founder of his clan.

On the other hand, Grudem’s claim that θεομοιος here means "ruler," is based on a misunderstanding of the Greek word γενάρχης (progenitor). Grudem claims that γενάρχης can also mean "ruler of created beings" and he cites LSJ for support. He then translates the sentence: "And Esau is the ruler of all the clan here described. . ."70 thereby equating "ruler" with θεομοιος. In equating θεομοιος with γενάρχης as "ruler of created beings," Grudem has committed the same logical and semantic fallacy that Kroeger did in translating θεομοιος as "source" due to the presence of κεφαλή in that passage (see section 2 above, p. 5ff).

Further, Grudem has simply misunderstood LSJ according to which γενάρχης has two senses: 1. founder or head of a family or race; 2. ruler of created beings.71 In the first sense, Philo uses the word to refer to humans as the founders or progenitors of their races (Who Is the Heir 279, of Abraham; On Dreams 1.167, of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; Preliminary Studies 133, of Moses or Levi). So also in Ps.-Lycochron’s (second century BC) Alexander 1307 of Dardanus, the ancestor of the Dardani, a Greek tribe.72 It should be noted that all such uses of γενάρχης involve a known ancestor who is obviously dead. Philo also uses the word in reference to the 70 Elders (Moses 1.189), and once apparently to mean “ethnarch” (ἐθνάρχης), a magisterial title, (Plato 74). In the second sense, the word invariably refers to a god (of Zeus in Callimachus Fragment 36 and in Babrius 142.3; of Kronos in Orphic Hymn 13.8; of God in the Corpus Hermeticum 13.21).73

Thus, based on these citations, most of which are in LSJ, it is most reasonable to conclude that γενάρχης means “progenitor” as the founder or ancestor of a tribe or people when applied to humans such as Esau who are already known to be such. This is no doubt the sense intended by Philo in Preliminary Studies 61, and it is correctly translated in the Loeb edition. Esau is not a “ruler of created beings” because he is clearly not a god. Rather than indicating that Esau is the ruler of his clan (which he cannot be because he is dead), the metaphorical use of θεομοιος denotes that Esau is the head, i.e. the beginning, the foremost member of his clan, just as the head is the foremost member of an animal’s body. There is no connotation of “source,” “rule,” or “authority over” here, but rather one of “starting-point.”

9. Plutarch74

There are several passages in Plutarch containing θεομοιος which have been alleged to mean “ruler” or “authority over.” These passages have been dealt with in more detail elsewhere,75 so I will not belabor the issues here except in summary. It must be borne in mind that Plutarch was also a Platonist and this fact has a bearing in the interpretation of his use of θεομοιος. The first four examples are taken from his Parallel Lives.

1) In Agis 2.3, θεομοιος is used literally with reference to a snake and is not a metaphor: “Ye cannot have the same man as your ruler and your slave.” Since in this case also one certainly can apply the fable of the serpent whose tail rebelled against its head (θεομοιος) and demanded the right to lead in turn instead of always following. . .

2) In Pelopidas 2.1, θεομοιος is clearly used by Plutarch as one part of a body analogy with reference to the military: “For if, as Iphicrates analyzes the matter, the light-armed troops are like the hands, the cavalry like the feet, the line of men-at-arms itself like chest and breastplate, and the general like the head (θεομοιος), then he, in taking undue risks and being over bold, would seem to neglect not himself, but all. . .”76 Of course, generals have authority over their troops. Plutarch is here using a metaphor, and the connotation of “authority” is clearly present in the overall context of the passage. Note, however, that the word θεομοιος is not used of the general independently as a metaphor.

3) In Galba 4.3, we see the closest parallel to the NT in that the word θεομοιος is used in conjunction with the word “body” (σῶμα) as a compound metaphor: “But after Vindex had openly declared war, he wrote to Galba inviting him to assume the imperial power, and thus to serve what was a vigorous body in need of a head (θεομοιος), meaning the Gallic provinces, which already had a hundred thousand men under arms. . .”77 Here the connotation of “authority” is readily derivable from the military context.

4) Cicero 14.6—“What dreadful thing, pray,” said [Cataline], “I am doing, if, when there are two bodies (σώματα), one lean and wasted, but with a head (θεομοιος), and the other headless (κεφαλαίος), but strong and large, I myself become a head (θεομοιος) for this?”78 Cataline (L. Sergius Catalina, a 1st century BC Roman statesman) made this statement to the Roman senate in an attempt to stir up a rebellion. Although the connotation of “authority” may be present here due to the context, there are two problems about this passage. First of all, Plutarch expressly states that Cataline spoke in a “riddle” (14.7), which may imply that the use of θεομοιος here was an unusual Greek idiom. Secondly, this “riddle” may have been influenced by Latin because the word caput (head) often is used as a metaphor for “leader.” The Latin source for this “riddle” is Cicero’s speech Pro Murena 25, 51. Hence, Plutarch may have been translating this passage from Latin rather literally. Any fair assessment of this passage must take these factors into consideration.

5) This final example is from the Moralia (692D–E), “Table Talk” 6.7.1—“The ancients even went so far as to call the wine ‘lees,’ just as we affectionately call a person ‘soul’ or ‘head’ (θεομοιος) from his ruling part.”79 Here the word θεομοιος is again used literally, not as a metaphor. Those who claim that “authority” is relevant here forget that the word θεομοιος was a common form of address in Greek. Just as we say, “Hey, man,” in addressing someone, so an ancient Greek would say ὃ θεομοιος (literally, “oh head”).80 Furthermore, Plutarch’s use of θεομοιος as the “ruling part” is surely derived from his Platonism. Remember that for Plato, the ruling part is not the head as such, but the soul which is merely located in the head.

These Plutarchian passages are of dubious value as proof that θεομοιος is an independent Greek metaphor for “ruler” or “authority over.”
It is clear that Evangelicals disagree regarding the understanding of the κεφαλὴ metaphor in St. Paul. Grudem and others maintain that “authority” or “ruler” is Paul’s point; others such as the Mickelsens, Payne, and Bilezikian maintain that “source” or “provider” is the point. Now it is true that Christ is our leader and ruler and that he does have authority over the church, and it is also true that he is the source and provider of our salvation, our lives, our very being in as much as he is the agent of creation—all this is readily derived from Christology.

The debate really revolves around the issue of the κεφαλὴ metaphor: to what extent are these subsidiary issues (authority, source, provider, prominence, etc.) bound to the meaning of κεφαλὴ? It is my belief that those who have previously written about the meaning of κεφαλὴ in the NT have made too much of what I consider to be a rather simple head-body metaphor by reading into one part of that metaphor meanings that are at best only implications that can be derived from the immediate context of a given passage. All living creatures have heads, and the head is typically the uppermost part of the body. Decapitated bodies are dead bodies. It would be senseless for St. Paul to speak of the church as the headless body of Christ.

With the explanation of “prominence” that I gave above in mind (see section 3 above, p. 6ff.), let us now examine the NT passages where someone (usually Christ) is called κεφαλὴ. Although there are many difficulties in some of the following passages, it is not my intent to provide a detailed exegesis of each one, but rather to explain how the notions of “source,” “authority,” or “prominence” may be relevant.

The first point that should be noted is that in five of the seven passages (Eph. 1:22f, 4:15f, 5:22; Col. 1:18, 2:19), the word σῶμα (body) is present. The church is the body and Christ is the head of that body. In these passages, St. Paul’s use of the words κεφαλὴ and σῶμα go together to form a composite metaphor (compare Plutarch’s Pelopidas 2.1 and Galba 4.3 above). Only in 1 Cor. 11:3 and Col. 2:10 does Paul use κεφαλὴ apart from σῶμα as an independent metaphor.32

1) Eph. 1:20–23: ... which [God] accomplished in Christ when he raised him from the dead and made him sit at his right hand in the heavenly places, far above all rule (ἐξουσία) and power and dominion, and above every name that is named, not only in this age but also in that which is to come; and he has put all things under his feet and has made him the head (κεφαλή) over all things for the Church, which is his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all.35

While I will not deny that authority is a relevant issue in this passage, the question is whether authority is the primary connotation here, derived from the word κεφαλὴ itself. It is certainly wrong to dismiss the notions of prominence and preeminence in this passage inasmuch as God the Father has set Christ at his right hand “far above” all rule, etc. Just as the head is above the physical body, so Christ is above everything in creation. Christ is also preeminent in the sense of being supreme. I fail to see how either of these notions could be denied in this passage, and I likewise fail to see why authority must be considered the primary connotation. We also see here the notion of topness quite clearly. This passage very nicely fits the semantic scenario I described above (see section 3 above, p. 8ff). On the other hand, the connotation of source does not fit the context at all. It makes no sense to say that Christ is the “source over” (ὑπέρ) all things in the church.

2) Eph. 4:15–16: Rather, speaking the truth in love, we are to grow up in every way into him who is the head (κεφαλή), into Christ, from whom the whole body (σῶμα), joined and knit together by every joint with which it is supplied when each part is working properly, makes bodily growth and upbuilds itself in love.36

In this passage, I think that both the Mickelsens’ connotation of “source” and Bilezikian’s of “provider” may be applicable, but I do not believe that those notions can be derived from the semantic range of the word κεφαλὴ itself. The connotation of “source” may be implied in the prepositional phrase from whom (ἐξ οὗ) and the overall tenor of the passage may speak of Christ as the provider of the body’s growth. Interestingly, although I disagree, Grudem admits that the sense “source of life” is possible for κεφαλὴ in Philo’s Preliminary Studies 61.66 If this connotation can be admitted in Philo, why can it not be admitted elsewhere, or here, if it is appropriate to the context? This is not to deny Christ’s authority. I just do not think that the connotation of “authority” is necessarily explicit in the metaphor in this passage.

3) Eph. 5:21–24: Be subject to one another out of reverence for Christ. Wives, be subject to your husbands, as to the Lord. For the husband is the head (κεφαλὴ) of the wife as Christ is the head (κεφαλὴ) of the Church, his body, and is himself its Savior. As the Church is subject to Christ, so let wives also be subject in everything to their husbands.67

The notion of authority is clearly implied in this context by the presence of the verb ὑποτάσσομαι (“to submit”—not ὑποτασσόμαι “to subjugate”), even though the connotation of authority is not always present in the meaning of this verb. As with all Greek words, ὑποτάσσομαι/ὑπακούω has a range of meanings, some of which have nothing to do with authority (e.g. “to place under,” cf. 1 Cor. 15:27 and Eph. 1:22; “to append,” etc.)68

Despite the punctuation of various Greek editions and English translations, it is not in fact clear whether verse 21 stands at the end of a paragraph or at the beginning of a paragraph, nor is it even clear that there is a paragraph break at this point. Verse 21 contains an admonition to mutual submission, and this applies to husbands by implication. True, St. Paul does not expressly tell husbands to submit to their wives; but neither does he expressly tell wives to love their husbands (cf. vs. 25). Are we then justified in concluding that wives need not love their husbands? Certainly not! Submission is a relevant issue in Ephesians 5, but it is not simply a matter of wives submitting to husbands. BAGD cites this passage along with a few others as examples “of submission in the sense of voluntary yielding in love” (p. 848). The details of the implications of submission in the NT are a matter for further discussion and interpretation, and lie outside the scope of this paper. In this passage, the notion of authority is not derived from the word κεφαλὴ, but rather than from the overall context.

4) Col. 1:17–18: He is before all things, and in him all things hold together. He is the head (κεφαλὴ) of the body (σῶμα), the Church; he is the beginning (ἐξουσία), the first-born from the dead, that in everything he might be pre-eminent (πρωτεύων).69
This passage speaks of Christ as being the “firstborn” of the dead, and as having the “first-place” in everything. “Preeminence” (πρωτεύω) is obviously relevant here and is so translated by Tyndale, in the KJV, and in the NKJV. Again, we have the head-body metaphor. Christ will occupy the most exalted place, which is the topmost place, just as the head occupies the topmost or prominent place with respect to the body. Of course Christ necessarily possesses authority, but I reiterate that the point of this discussion is whether the word κεφαλή denotes “authority” in and of itself, or whether “authority” is derivable primarily from the context. I claim that the latter is true.

5) Col. 2:18–19: Let no one disqualify you, insisting on self-abasement and worship of angels, taking his stand on visions, buffed up without reason by his sensuous mind, and not holding fast to the Head (κεφαλή), from whom the whole body (σώμα), nourished and knit together through its joints and ligaments, grows with a growth that is from God.

This passage has a number of similarities to Ephesians 4:15–16, and I think that the notion of “source” or “source of life” may be an implication derivable solely from the context. “Authority” may or may not be applicable here. In the overall context of Colossians 2, St. Paul is warning his readers against going off the doctrinal deep end and of becoming “buffed up without reason by his sensuous mind” rather than “holding fast to the head.” It seems reasonable to me to interpret this passage in terms of a head-body metaphor. The body, the church, is sustained by the head, Christ, and one risks one’s life in abandoning the head. The implication is that the Christian will not survive apart from Christ just as members of our human bodies will not survive if they are cut off from our bodies.

The final two NT passages contain κεφαλή as an independent metaphor, not joined with the body (σώμα).

6) 1 Cor. 11:3–5: But I want you to understand that the head (κεφαλή) of every man is Christ, the head (κεφαλή) of a woman is her husband, and the head (κεφαλή) of Christ is God. Any man who prays or prophesies with his head covered (κατὰ κεφαλήν) dishonors his head (κεφαλή), but any woman who prays or prophesies with her head (κεφαλῆς) unveiled dishonors her head (κεφαλὴ)—it is the same as if her head were shaven.

Only in verse three is κεφαλή used (thrice) as a metaphor. In verses four and five, it is used literally (although some expositors press a metaphorical meaning). Despite the numerous exegetical problems with this passage, I think that both connotations of “authority” and “preeminence” may be relevant here. Both the Greco-Roman culture and the Jewish culture of the first century were indisputably male-dominant. Males had decided advantages over females in nearly every respect, legally, socially, politically, etc. If Paul’s words here are taken as a reflection of such a cultural attitude, the idea of preeminence does not seem to me to be wholly irrelevant, nor does authority. Males were prominent with regard to females and exercised authority over them; in the same way, Christ is prominent with regard to humans. I doubt that a first century mind would have had as much difficulty understanding this comparison as we do today.

What about “source” here? At first blush, “source” may look possible, but as Hurley has explained, it runs into trouble because of St. Paul’s parallelism. If κεφαλή means “source” here, then God becomes the source of Christ and this implication has serious repercussions for Christology. I seriously doubt that “source” is a viable option in this passage.

7) Col. 2:9–10: “For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness of life in him, who is the head (κεφαλή) of all of rule (ἐξουσία) and authority (ἐξουσία).”

This passage has some similarities to Eph. 1:20–23. The notion of “authority” may be present, but so are “preeminence” and “preeminence.” Again, the question is which notion, if any, is primary? It is unlikely that “source” is applicable in this context because that would make Christ the source of “every ruler and authority” and that does not make much sense in this context.

In most of the NT passages, “authority” is implied within the overall context, as are “preeminence” or “preeminence.” In two passages (Eph. 4:15–16 and Col. 2:18–19), “source” may be possible due to the context and depending on how the passages are interpreted. However, neither “authority” nor “source” is the primary meaning of the κεφαλή metaphor throughout Paul’s writings.

11. Conclusion

What then does κεφαλή mean? The answer is easy: the literal “head.” What then of the connotations and metaphorical extensions of κεφαλή? How does one explain them (references to tops of mountains, trees, waves; sources or mouths of rivers; and so forth)? The most comprehensive explanation, as Chadwick has also pointed out, is that κεφαλῆς, as the topmost part of the body, was extended to refer to the tops of things (hence, “top” or “summit” of mountains, etc.), or the ends of things (hence, “source” or “mouth” of rivers). This is in full accord with my explanation in section 3 above (p. 8ff) which I arrived at independently of Chadwick.

In pre-biblical Greek (archaic, classical, early Hellenistic), the word κεφαλή is hardly used as a personal metaphor at all, and does not mean “source” or “ruler” or “authority over.” Furthermore, any claim that these are “common” meanings or implications for κεφαλή during these periods is empirically wrong. Also, the argument that κεφαλή later took on its connotation of “authority” from the noun κεφάλαιον (sum, total, chief) is false.

The use of κεφαλή as a personal metaphor first occurs in the Septuagint, and that usage is most likely due to Hebraic influence because (1) it is used thus relatively infrequently (about 11 of about 180 occurrences = 6%) and (2) the existence of several variants (κεφαλή or ἀρχή) in some manuscripts testify that there was uncertainty about the metaphor in Greek at some point. In Hellenistic, non-biblical Greek, κεφαλή is sometimes used with literal reference, but as a simile. Any possible connotations of “preeminence” or “authority” are derived only from a given context, although “topness” is the only implication which is relevant across the board. The notion of “source” is inapplicable. Claims that “source” or “ruler” are valid meanings of κεφαλή are often based upon mistranslations or misappropriations of other Greek words present in a given context (e.g., ἀρχή “beginning” not “source” or γενέαρχης “progenitor” not “ruler”).

It has been suggested that St. Paul was thinking in Hebrew or Aramaic while writing in Greek and that he intended κεφαλή to denote either “source” or “authority over.” Given
the excellent quality of Paul's Koine Greek and the apparent ease with which he functioned in Greco-Roman culture, I seriously doubt that he found it necessary to think in Hebrew. I have done so is as yet far from vindicated. I close with his warning to Timothy: “Remind them of this, and charge them before the Lord to avoid disputing about words, which does no good, but only ruins the hearers” (2 Tim. 2:14).

Notes


4. In the various articles that I have consulted while researching this topic, I have seen too many occurrences of erroneous citations and references to ancient authors. At times, the word κεφαλή is not even used in Greek although the word “head” may have appeared in some English translation; at other times the original context is irrelevant to the topic at hand; and sometimes the reference is simply wrong, making it very difficult, if not impossible, to verify the citation.


6. Of course, ruler has other denotations such as “measuring stick,” but these are irrelevant to this discussion.


8. The meanings of words may change drastically over a relatively short period of time. The English word gay is a good example. The old connotation of the word (18/90’s (“carefree, happy”) is completely different from the modern connotation of the word (1990’s (re: homosexual rights). It took less than a century for this change to come about. Many young people today have no understanding of the older meaning of gay as “happy.”

9. For details regarding the history of the Greek language, see the following:


10. One need only read Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey or several of Plato’s dialogues (e.g., Republic, Timaeus, Phaedo) to see this.

11. C. C. Kroeger, “The Classical Concept of Head as ‘Source’” (see note 1).

12. It may be true that some Greek philosophers conceived of the head as the source or origin of this or that bodily or cognitive function; and yes, Athena was borne of Zeus’ head, but the fact remains that κεφαλή is not used as a metaphor for source or origin in the majority of Greek authors so cited.


14. The translation is mine; the text is in O. Kern, Orphicorum Fragmenta (Berlin: Weidmann, 1922), 91ff.

15. LSJ, 252 and the Revised Supplement, 53; there are also several other meanings listed which are not relevant to this discussion.

16. See Chadwick, Lexicographica Graeca, 183 wherein this passage is cited.


18. See Chadwick, Lexicographica Graeca, 181 wherein this passage is cited.


25. See also J. Chadwick’s discussion of κεφαλή, in Lexicographica Graeca, 177–183. Chadwick’s discussion supports my contention regarding “prominence,” but nowhere does he acknowledge either the notions of source or authority over as valid extensions of the word κεφαλή. My explanation here (© 1991, see note 3 above) is independent of Chadwick’s (1996).

26. Grudem, “Head,” 79; Grudem, “Response,” 449, 453–4. Grudem erroneously identifies the word in question as the adjective κεφαλικός; however, LSJ’s treatment of the noun κεφαλικόν is listed as a sub-entry under the heading of κεφάλις.

27. Following are the citations in LSJ, 945:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Page</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epipolus, Fragment 93</td>
<td>5th century BC</td>
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<td>Menander, Perikeiromene 173</td>
<td>ca. 342–292 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucian of Samosata, Harmonides 3</td>
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<td>Callinus, Philoepimenides 6, Piscator 14</td>
<td>ca. 100–160 AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appian, Bella Civilia 5,50, 5,43</td>
<td>331–363 AD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Greek texts and English translations for all these authors except Epipolus are available in the Loeb Classical Library series.


ο δ’ Ἐστίνοι ήν τοις Δήμοις παραδεχόμενος περὶ ἐκκαθάριστον τῶν ἀναζημαντόντων ἐξ ἱδῶν διακηρυγμάτων, ὡς ἡ Περισσεύουσα τελευταίου· οὗτοι περὶ κεφαλίσιν τῶν ἑβάθειν ἤγηκαν.


31. There is a passage in Herodotus' Histories (7.148) containing κεφαλή which is also alleged to mean "authority over," but the use of κεφαλή there is literal, not metaphorical. See Cervin, "Rebuttal," 94–95.

32. The traditional method of citing Plato is to use section numbers along with the letters a-e which denote the subsection. All Greek texts of Plato as well as any decent English translation include these numbers in the margin.

33. Cooper, Plato: Complete Works, 1248. The word κεφαλή is used only once by Plato in this passage, as noted above. Full Greek text:


39. Rom. 1:21: καὶ ἐκτιθήθη δὴ ὁ αὐτῶν καθαρὸς καθαρὸς. The t

40. 2 Cor. 9:7: ἐκακότας καθαρὰς ἐργασάτω τή καθαρότητα.


44. Grudem claimed that κεφαλή occurred twice in an English passage in Hesiod where the word was used only once in Greek. So also, in Isaiah 9:13–14 (LXX); see Cervin, "Rebuttal," 94, 98.


47. So also Bilezkiian, Beyond Sex Roles, 239.

48. The Old Testament translations that follow are from the Orthodox Study Bible (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2008), which is based largely on Rahlfs' Greek edition of the LXX text. The letters A and B denote the Greek manuscripts Alexandrinus and Vatikanus respectively.


51. Isaiah 7:8–9: ἀλλ’ ἡ κεφαλή Ἀραμ Δαμασκός, ἀλλ’ ἐγένετο καὶ πέντε ἡμέρας ηὐλείαις ἡ βασιλεία Εφραίμ ἀπὸ λαοῦ, καὶ ἡ κεφαλή Εφραίμ Σιων, καὶ ἡ κεφαλή Σιων ἡ εἰς τὸν Ρομέλιον καὶ ἐὰν μὴ πιστεύσῃ, ὁδὸν μὴ συνῆλθεν.

52. Isaiah 7:8–9: ἀλλ’ ἡ κεφαλή Ἀραμ Δαμασκός, ἀλλ’ ἐγένετο καὶ πέντε ἡμέρας ηὐλείαις ἡ βασιλεία Εφραίμ ἀπὸ λαοῦ, καὶ ἡ κεφαλή Εφραίμ Σιων, καὶ ἡ κεφαλή Σιων ἡ εἰς τὸν Ρομέλιον καὶ ἐὰν μὴ πιστεύσῃ, ὁδὸν μὴ συνῆλθεν.


54. See Chadwick, Lexicographica Graeca, 183 for the sense of "starting-point" for κεφαλή.


56. LSJ, 342, but see the Revised Supplement, 75 for corrections and revisions.

57. The text is in the Loeb Classical Library.

παντὸς ἀκολουθεῖν ἐκείνῃ. . .

οὐρὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ στασιάσαν ἀξιοῦν ἡγεῖσθαι παρὰ μέρος καὶ μὴ διὰ ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει γε καὶ οὕτως τὸ τοῦ δράκοντος, οὗ φησιν ὁ μῦθος τὴν πλήρωμα τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν πληρουμένου.

κεφαλὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἥτις ἐστὶν τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, τὸ μέλλοντι καὶ πάντα ὑπέταξεν ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸν ἔδωκεν ὀνόματος ὀνομαζομένου οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ πάσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ κυριότητος καὶ παντὸς νεκρῶν καθίσας ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις ὑπεράνω.

The text and translation of the Orphic Hymns are found in A. N. Athanassakis, The Orphic Hymns (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1977), 22–23. The citation listed in LSJ that I have been unable to check is the inscription IG 5 1:497, which LSJ state refers to Heracles, a demigod.

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Evangelicals and the Doctrine of the Trinity

Kevin Giles

In the United States, the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS) is a very significant organization with over four thousand members. It claims to be the voice of conservative evangelical scholarship. In its “Doctrinal Basis” only two matters are made fundamental for belonging to this association: belief in the inerrancy of the Bible in its original autographs and belief in a Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: three “uncreated” persons, who are “one in essence, equal in power and glory.” In the history of the ETS, the first fundamental belief has often painfully divided members; the second, until recently, has not. Now the Trinity is also becoming a very divisive issue in the ETS family. Millard Erickson’s book, Who’s Tampering with the Trinity? An Assessment of the Subordination Debate makes this public. Erickson is a highly respected and well-informed evangelical systematic theologian, who was president of the ETS in 2002. In this book he seeks to be as generous as he can to those who are teaching “the eternal role subordination of the Son” but he concludes this doctrine implies “an unorthodox dimension of the doctrine of the Trinity.” I go a step further, arguing that to eternally subordinate the Son in authority under the Father in hierarchical order introduces the theological error called “subordinationism.” It calls into question that the Son is “equal in power” with the Father as the ETS statement of faith asserts. This division of opinion among evangelicals on the Trinity, the editors of The New Evangelical Subordinationism say, has “ignited a firestorm of controversy in today’s evangelical academy.”

The post 1970s evangelical doctrine of the eternally subordinated Son

George W. Knight III, the 1995 president of the ETS, in his highly influential book, New Testament Teaching on the Role Relationship of Men and Women, published in 1977, first formulated the novel argument that just as women are permanently subordinated in authority to their husbands in the home and to male leaders in the church, so likewise is the Son of God eternally subordinated in authority to the Father. He thus speaks of a “chain of subordination” in the Trinity, adding that the Son’s subordination in authority has “certain ontological aspects.” This last comment is somewhat surprising because one of the completely new elements in his seminal case for the permanent subordination of women is that women are not (ontologically) inferior to men, only permanently role or functionally differentiated. This new teaching on the Trinity came to full fruition in 1994 with the publication of Wayne Grudem’s Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine. Grudem was the president of the ETS in 1999. The impact of his Systematic Theology on evangelicals cannot be overestimated. It is one of the most widely used theology texts in evangelical seminaries and Bible colleges, having sold more than 300,000 copies. He is emphatic: the eternal subordination of the Son in authority stands right at the heart of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. What he teaches, he claims repeatedly, is what the best of theologians from the past and the creeds teach. For Grudem, the Father has “the role of commanding, directing, and sending,” and the Son has the role of “obeying, going as the Father sends, and revealing God to us.” It is differing authority, he says, that primarily differentiates the divine persons. He writes, “Authority and submission between the Father and the Son . . . and the Holy Spirit, is the fundamental difference between the persons of the Trinity.” And again, “If we did not have such differences in authority in the relationships among the members of the Trinity, then we would not know of any differences at all.” For Grudem, nothing is more important than the authority structure both in the Trinity and between men and women. It is, he says, “the most fundamental aspect of interpersonal relationships in the entire universe.”

Almost identical teaching is given by Bruce Ware in his book, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. He argues that the eternal subordination of the Son in authority to the Father marks the very nature of the eternal Being of the one who is three. In this authority-submission structure, the three Persons understand the rightful place each has. The Father possesses the place of supreme authority . . . the Son submits to the Father. Thus he concludes that a “hierarchical structure of authority exists in the eternal Godhead.” Again the ontological language used should be noted as well as the clear affirmation of “hierarchical” ordering in divine life. Ware says he is arguing for the eternal role or functional subordination of the Son but uses the ontological language of nature and eternal Being to define the Son’s subordination.

At this point two observations must be made. First, the majority of the evangelicals who teach the eternal subordination of the Son in “role,” meaning authority, are committed to the permanent subordination of women. The two issues are closely related for them. This certainly makes us wonder if this agenda has not determined their doctrine of the Trinity. This charge cannot be reversed because, as a general rule, egalitarian evangelicals do not appeal to the Trinity as the ground for male-female equality. Second, this teaching on the Trinity is now widely assumed by many conservative evangelicals to be what orthodoxy teaches. But it is not, as reference to any good historical study of the Nicene Fathers, including Augustine, makes obvious. Indeed, the Athanasian Creed, as we will show later, explicitly excludes any hierarchical ordering within the life of the trine God.

Terminology

In the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity, a number of words used of God as one and three gradually became technical terms, and agreed synonyms in differing languages (Greek, Latin, English) were recognized. In speaking of God as one, the terms “being,” “substance,” “essence,” and “nature” were accepted as synonyms. In speaking of any one of the divine three the words “person,” “hypostasis,” and “subsistence” were taken as synonyms. Given this fact, the ETS doctrinal affirmation that God is “one in essence” means exactly the same as if it was said that God is one in “nature,” “being,” or “substance.”
It was the same with words speaking of the Son’s rule and dominion. In seeking to diminish the Son, all the fourth-century Arians insisted that the Son was not of the same being as the Father and thus did not have the same ultimate power. He was subordinate in being, authority, and majesty. We see an example of the various terms and phrases that could be used to functionally set the Son under the Father in the confession of Eunomius, the Neo-Arian. He says,

We believe in the one and only true God. . . . he has no sharer of his Godhead nor participator of his glory nor joint possessor of his authority nor consort of the throne of his kingdom, for he [the Father] is the one and sole God almighty.

And we believe in the Son of God . . . He is obedient in creating and giving being to things that exist, obedient in all his administration . . . .

In reply, all the Nicene fathers, predicating their arguments on the Bible, insist that divine rule is trinitarian. If each divine person is truly God, each can be confessed as “the Lord” and each is omnipotent. Wanting to use a word prescribed by Scripture, and to have one agreed technical term, the Nicene fathers taught that the Son was one in being and power. Michele Barnes says that for the Cappadocian fathers, 1 Corinthians 1:24 was the pivotal text. Here Paul speaks of “Christ the power of God.” From this point on, oneness in being and oneness in power are definitive for orthodoxy. It is taken as a premise that if the three divine persons are definitive for power they had spoken of the differing power of the Father and the Son, they seem to mean much the same as if they had said of the differing power of the Father and the Son. In any case I cannot see how anyone could sharply differentiate these two words when used of God. The words “power” and “authority” both designate essential divine attributes. Orthodoxy with one voice holds that all the divine attributes are equally shared by the three divine persons. God is one in being and attributes. Charles Hodge rightly summarizes orthodoxy when he says, “In the Bible all divine titles and attributes are ascribed equally to the Father, Son, and Spirit.”

In what follows I will therefore assume that when the ETS doctrinal statement speaks of the triune God as “one in essence” it means the same as if it had said one in being, the wording most English speaking theologians today prefer. And when it speaks of the divine three as “equal in power,” it means the same as if it had said equal in authority or equal in dominion, which is what Knight, Grudem, Wâre, and large numbers of contemporary conservative evangelicals deny.

In seeking to clarify terminology, the modern word “role” needs to be discussed. In historic orthodoxy, theologians speak of the differing “works” or “operations” or sometimes “actions” of the divine persons, yet insisting that they work “inseparably.” In contemporary theological writings the modern word “role” is sometimes used as a synonym for these traditional terms. If it is used to refer to what the divine three do, as in the case of the other terms, this raises no problems. However, when evangelical “complementarians” use the word “role” they consistently give it another meaning, one not found in any dictionary of sociological text. It is used to speak of who rules and who obeys—power relations. The Father has the “role” of commanding; the Son the “role” of obeying. This use of the word “role” cannot be justified. One of the key tasks in the theological enterprise is to sort out terminology and gain consistency. The use of a word in a non-dictionary sense that only obfuscates what is being argued is a serious flaw in theological work.

The Bible

The New Testament puts the confession, “Jesus is Lord,” right at the heart of what it means to be a Christian. This confession declares that the resurrected and exalted Son of God is God in the fullest sense and as such has absolute authority (Matt. 28:18; Eph. 1:20–21; Col. 2:10). He functions as the supreme ruler because he is the supreme ruler: function indicates ontology. The title “Son” in the New Testament also speaks of divine rule, as well as intimacy with the Father. When the Father addresses Jesus as “my beloved Son,” he is indicating that he is to reign as the king’s son in all might, majesty, and power. This title should not be understood on the basis of human experience to suggest subordination, as the original Arians did and contemporary evangelical subordinationists, to a man, do today. Often in the New Testament, the ruling authority of the Son is spoken of in the imagery of him “sitting at the right hand of God” (Acts 2:33; Col. 3:1 etc.). In the book of Revelation, the imagery is different. The Father and the Son rule from the one throne “for ever and ever” (7:10–12, 11:15; cf. 1:6, 18).

For Paul, the Son’s obedience is strictly limited to his work as the second Adam who is perfectly obedient (Rom. 5:12ff; 1 Cor. 15:22; Phil. 2:8), or in the book of Hebrews to the “days of his flesh” (Heb. 5:7–9). In the Gospel of John, the Son gladly does the Father’s will (4:34, 5:30, 6:38–39, etc.), but the evangelist never suggests that Jesus is under compulsion to do as the Father commands, or that he can do no other. Rather, says Thompson, John thinks of Jesus as the “instrument or expression of the Father’s will.” The word obedience is never used in connection with the Father-Son relationship in John.

Without seriously discussing the biblical teaching I have just outlined that ascribes to the exalted Christ absolute authority, some take as proof of their position 1 Corinthians 11:3: “God is the head of Christ.” In both the patristic debates about the Trinity and in Calvin, this text gains little attention because it is not taken to suggest the eternal subordination of the Son. In contrast, in the contemporary evangelical case for the eternal (authoritative) “headship” of the Father over the Son, 1 Corinthians 11:3 is central and much-discussed. Grudem tells us this verse is “decisive” for his understanding of the Trinity and women. He says that Paul here refers to a “relationship of authority between God the Father and God the Son, and he is making a parallel between that relationship in the Trinity and that between a husband and wife in marriage.” Basic to Grudem’s case is his thesis that the Greek word κεφαλή when used metaphorically (translated into English as “head”), always means a “person in authority over.” At this late stage in the debate over the force of this word, this assertion is untenable. The evidence is in. When used metaphorically, mean either “head-over” or “source/origin,” among other things. Thus how it is understood in 1 Corinthians 11:3 (and Eph. 5:23) must be
determined by the immediate context in which the word is used. That Paul is saying the Father is set over the Son in authority, Christ over man, and man over woman is highly unlikely. Why begin by subordinating women, and then immediately endorse women leading the church in prayer and prophecy? It is far more likely that in this text, kephele bears the metaphorical meaning of “source” / “origin,” specifically, “the source of life.” Christ is the kephele/head of every man, in the sense that he is the source/origin of every man (the doctrine of creation); man/Adam is the source/origin of woman (alluding to Genesis 2 which the apostle again mentions in v 12), and the Father is the source/origin of the Son (the Son is “from” the Father; the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son).

In any case, in 1 Corinthians 11:3 Paul does not allude to a fourfold hierarchy, God-Christ-man-woman, but to three, paired relationships in which in each case one party is the source/origin of the other. They are not ordered hierarchically. Paul speaks first of Christ and man, then man and woman, and last of God and Christ. Rather than subordinating the persons in a descending “chain of command,” or “hierarchy of headship,” Paul is differentiating the “persons” paired to introduce the main point he wants to make in the whole passage, namely that what a man or woman has or has not on their “head” when they lead in church should reflect God-ordained sexual differentiation.

All should agree that 1 Corinthians11:3 is a difficult text, but to interpret it to mean that the Father eternally has authority over the Son is not convincing. It would contradict Paul’s teaching that Christ now reigns as Lord and is “head over all things” (Eph. 1:22; Col. 2:10). Here we need to remember that evangelical theological exegesis can never allow an interpretation of one difficult-to-understand text that would set it in conflict with what is plainly and repeatedly taught elsewhere. The rule is that difficult-to-understand texts must always be interpreted so that they harmonize with what is plain and primary in Scripture. What is central to the New Testament is Christ’s unqualified lordship. It is in this light that 1 Corinthians 11:3 must be understood.

Evidence for the eternal subordination of the Son in authority is also found by those holding to this hierarchical understanding of the Trinity in the biblical language of sending (c.f. John 8:42; 17:3, 23), and in the titles “Father” and “Son.” They argue that because Jesus is sent by the Father, he must be a subordinate who has to do as he is commanded. Augustine tells us that the fourth century Arians also made it an “axiom” that “the one who sends is greater than the one sent.” It is always tempting to interpret the Scriptures on the basis of human experience, but good exegesis should begin by seeking to discover what the biblical authors had in mind when they wrote. There has been much debate in recent years on the force and ideas behind this “sending” language. It is generally conceded that behind this terminology lies the idea of “agency.” The Son represents the Father. I am persuaded that the most plausible interpretation of this sending language is in terms of the Jewish Shulach concept. In Rabbinical writings the one sent (the Shulach) has the same authority as the one who sends him: he is as the sender himself. This principle is stated many times: “The one who is sent is like the one who sent him.” In this case, the one sent is none other than the Father’s only Son. Thus Jesus says, “Anyone who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him” (John 5:23, italics added). This means that the sending terminology is best understood as underscoring the unity between the Father and the Son in their work (John 5:17–18; 10:29–30), and as explaining how the words of the Son are the words of the Father (John 3:34; 12:50; 14:10–11). To disobey God the Son is exactly the same as to disobey God the Father. Both have the same divine authority; both are to be obeyed. Nevertheless it is to be recognized that the human language of sending distinguishes the persons—the Father is the one who sends, the Son the one who is sent. There is an order or fixed pattern in how the Father and the Son (and the Spirit) are related and work in the world. Nothing is random in God or in his actions.

Evangelicals who argue for the eternal subordination of the Son in authority also consistently claim that his title “Son” proves that he is eternally set under his Father’s authority. This argument is repeated in almost every example of this distinctive evangelical doctrine. Christopher Cowan typically says, “The Father-Son language in John seems to imply a hierarchical relationship.” The evidence in support of this opinion is entirely drawn from human experience. In the human family, sons obey their fathers. In reply to this argument we need to say again, evangelical theology should not be based on human experience, but on Scripture, and in Scripture the title “Son” speaks of Jesus’ royal prerogatives. He is the King’s anointed Son who rules in all might, majesty, and authority. John Frame says that in the New Testament, “there is considerable overlapping between the concepts Lord and Son . . . both indicate Jesus’ power and prerogatives as God. Lordship presupposes sonship, sonship implies lordship.”

In this appeal to the ordinary, everyday meaning of the words “send,” “son,” and “father” to prove that Jesus as the eternal Son of God is eternally subordinated to the Father in authority, language used of God is understood literally, or to use the technical term, “univocally.” This is exactly how the fourth-century Arians understood language about the Father and the Son. In reply to them, Athanasius, the Cappadocian Fathers, and Augustine argued that this practice leads to idolatry—the depicting of God as a human being. For this reason, orthodox theologians have generally agreed that all human language used of God should be understood analogically. Human words can convey truth about God, but the content of the human words used of God is found not by appeal to human relationships and experience, but in revelation. It is from the Bible we learn what the titles “Son,” “Father,” and the word “sent” mean when used of divine persons.

I conclude my brief summary of biblical teaching on the unqualified lordship of Christ by quoting Cornelius Van Til, “a consistent biblical doctrine of the Trinity [implies] the complete rejection of all subordinationism.”

The historical debate

Arius was quite convinced that the Son is eternally set under the Father’s authority. The Son must do as the Father commands. For Arius and all who in the fourth century were called Arians, God the Father is an unoriginated monad, and for this reason, the Son and the Spirit are radically different and unlike him. They could be spoken of as “God,” but not in the same sense as the Father. On this basis, the Arians taught that the Father and the Son (in the early stage of the debate it was these two divine persons who were in focus) are of different being and authority. That Arius ontologically subordinated the Son to the Father is well known. What is less well known and adequately recognized, is that he and all the other so-called
fourth-century Arians also subordinated the Son in authority. Richard Hanson in his monumental study of Arianism says the Arians consistently taught that the Son “does the Father’s will and exhibits obedience and subordination to the Father, and adores and praises the Father, not only in his earthly ministry but in Heaven.” In their important study, Early Arianism, Robert Gregg and Dennis Groh actually make the eternal subordination in authority of the Son the primary element in Arian theology—the Son’s ontological subordination was simply a necessary logical outcome. They write, “At the center of Arian theology was a redeemer obedient to his Father’s will.” And for “Arius and his fellow thinkers . . . the Father and the Son relationship was a relationship in which the former was prior, superior, and dominant. . . . Conceived relationally rather than ontologically it was marked by dependence rather than co-equality.” What authority the Son had was of a “derivative character.” The supreme Father gave it to him: “The derivative character of the power and authority manifest in Jesus’ ministry was traced by Arian exegetes from a series of biblical texts which spoke of the things bestowed on him by the Father.” Thus, “the savior who the early Arians discovered in Scripture and of Arian theology was a redeemer who followed God’s commands.”

What completely surprised me in reading this book was that the way Gregg and Groh described the essence of Arianism is almost identical to how many contemporary evangelicals depict the divine Father-Son relationship. The Father is prior and supreme. He rules over the Son. Any authority the Son has is derived from the Father.

**Athanasius**

In reply to the early Arians, Athanasius would not allow any disjunction or separation between the Father and the Son in being, work, or divine attributes, especially in authority. The God of the Bible, he held, is not a monad who has a subordinate Son. He is for all eternity a triad of inseparable and equal divine persons. Athanasius writes, “The faith of Christians acknowledges the blessed Triad as unalterable and perfect and ever what it was.” Because the Son and Father are inseparably one God, Athanasius asked the Arians, “Must not he who is perfect be equal to God?” He, of course, believed only an affirmative answer was possible. Athanasius’ tenacious belief that the Father and the Son cannot be divided or separated in any way leads him repeatedly to lay down what may be called the Athanasian rule: “The same things are said of the Son which are said of the Father, except for calling him Father.” From this it follows that Athanasius cannot allow that the Son is eternally set under the Father in being or authority. The logic and consistency of his reasoning is compelling. At no point at any time does he waver from his belief that the Father and the Son are inseparably one in being, work/function, and authority. Athanasius specifically affirms that the Father and the Son are equally omnipotent. Speaking of the Son he says, “[He] is seated upon the same throne as the Father.” “He is Lord and King everlasting.” “For he ever was and is Lord and sovereign of all, being like in all things to the Father.” “He is Lord of all because he is one with the Father’s Lordship.”

**The Cappadocians**

Arguments against the idea that the Son is set under the authority of the Father and thus must always obey him fill the voluminous writings of the Cappadocians. It is clear why this is so. Eunomius, the Cappadocians’ arch neo-Arian opponent, subordinated the Son in being, and authority to the Father, as we have already noted.

In their reply to Eunomius’ teaching, the Cappadocians, like Athanasius, first of all make a clear distinction between the Son of God as God and the Son of God in the incarnation. They argue that the subordination the Son chose in becoming incarnate in no way impinged on his divine status as equal with God the Father. Gregory of Nyssa writes, “We recognize two things in Christ, one divine, the other human, the divine by nature, but the human in the incarnation. We accordingly claim for the Godhead that which is eternal and that which is created we ascribe to his human nature.”

The biblical comments on the incarnate Son’s obedience, the Cappadocians take to refer solely to Christ’s soteriological work culminating in the cross. In this work, he is rightly seen by them as the second Adam, the representative human being. Gregory of Nyssa addressing Eunomius writes, “The mighty Paul says he became obedient (Phil. 2:8) . . . to accomplish the mystery of redemption by the cross, who had emptied himself by assuming the likeness and fashion of a man . . . healing the disobedience of men by his own obedience.”

Similarly, Gregory Nazianzus says the Son, “became obedient . . . by becoming for our sakes flesh, a servant and a curse, and sin.” He did so according to “his free will.” Noting that Christ goes voluntarily and freely to the cross (John 10:18) he adds, “Even in the time of his passion he is not separated from his authority; where can heresy possibly discern the subordination to authority of the King of Glory?” Then later he says, “In his character as the Word he is neither obedient nor disobedient. For such expressions belong to servants, and inferiors. . . . In character of the form of a servant, he condescends to his fellow servants.”

For the Cappadocians the divine Father and Son can only have one will because they are one in being. To teach that the Son must submit his will to the will of the Father, and the Spirit submit his will to the will of the Father and the Son, as Eunomius and the other Arians did, the Cappadocians recognized as introducing tritheism. For them, what the Father wills and what the Son wills are always one. In reply to the Arians who made much of the Son going, speaking, and doing as the Father wills, Basil argues that the Son’s will is connected in indissoluble union with the Father. Do not let us then understand by what is called a “commandment” a peremptory mandate delivered by organs of speech, and giving orders to the Son, as to a subordinate, concerning what he ought to do. Let us rather in a sense befitting the Godhead, perceive the transmission of will, like the reflection of an object in a mirror, passing without note of time from Father to Son.

Eunomius’ attempt to explain God in human categories by likening the Son to a servant who only has delegated authority particularly angered Gregory of Nyssa. Eunomius put his argument in this way:

In a wealthy establishment one may see the more active and devoted servant set over his fellow servants by the command of his master, and so invested with superiority over others in the same rank.

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The Cappadocians cannot allow human language used of God to be taken literally, they never suggest that the name Father implies authority over the Son. Their constant teaching, as we have seen, is that the Father and the Son have the same divine attributes, most importantly omnipotence. Gregory of Nazianzus puts their position succinctly:

“To us there is one God, for the Godhead is one . . . though we believe in three persons. For one is not more and another less God; nor is one before or after another; nor are they divided in will or parted in power.”

Michel Barnes says that all the pro-Nicene theologians of the second half of the fourth century held that “the Father and the Son have the one power [because] they have one and the same nature.”

**Augustine**

Augustine likewise gives no support whatsoever to the idea that Christ is eternally set under the Father’s authority. He cannot, because he insists on the “inseparable equality” of the divine three. He is implacably against subordinating the Son to the Father in any way.

The late Arians against whom Augustine is arguing made much of the biblical language of “sending,” presuming the “axiom” that “the one who sends is greater than the one sent.” In reply Augustine argues that being sent does not necessarily entail servitude, only that the one sent comes “from” the sender. He thus concludes that just as the terms “unbegotten” and “begotten” differentiate the Father and the Son, while not suggesting any eternal subordination, so too do the terms “sending” and “being sent.” What Augustine has seen clearly is that human terms such as “begetting” and “sending” when used of divine persons do not necessarily have the same content as they do in everyday speech—they are thus not to be taken literally. Building on this principle, Augustine formulates one of his several rules of interpretation.

Texts that speak of the Son’s sending by the Father do not teach that “the Son is less than the Father, but that he is from the Father. This does not imply any dearth of equality, but only his birth in eternity.”

In Augustine’s model of the Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are “co-eternal” and “co-equal.” Transfer this notion to the doctrines concerning the Godhead, so that the Only-begotten God, though subject to the sovereignty of his superior, is in no way hindered by the authority of his sovereign in the direction of those inferior to him.

Eunomius’ reasoning, Gregory holds, leads to “heresy.” The triune Godhead is “simple, uncompounded and indivisible.” If the Father is “Lord,” so too is the Son. It is not possible for them to have “contrary attributes.” Setting the Son under the Father’s authority in this way, Gregory says, leads to idolatry:

“He who affirms the Only-begotten to be a slave, makes him out by so saying to be a fellow servant with himself; and hence will of necessity . . . worship himself instead of God. For if he sees in himself slavery, and the object of his worship also in slavery, he of course looks at himself, seeing the whole of himself in that which he worships.”

Because the Cappadocians cannot allow human language used of God to be taken literally, they never suggest that the name Father implies authority over the Son. Their constant teaching, as we have seen, is that the Father and the Son have the same divine attributes, most importantly omnipotence. Gregory of Nazianzus puts their position succinctly:

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**The Athanasian Creed**

In the so-called Athanasian Creed composed in about AD 500, what is basically Augustine’s teaching on the Trinity is identified as “the catholic faith.” In this creed the unity of the divine Trinity is to the fore, and any suggestion that the Son or Spirit is subordinated in being or authority is unambiguously excluded. Three clauses specifically deny that the Son is less than the Father in authority:

“So likewise the Father is almighty, the Son almighty, and the Holy Spirit almighty. And yet there are not three almighties but one almighty.”

“So likewise the Father is Lord, the Son is Lord and the Holy Spirit is Lord. And yet not three Lords but one Lord.”

“In this Trinity none afore or after another: none is greater or less than another . . . all are co-equal” (no ranking, no hierarchical ordering of any kind.).

The only difference allowed between the members of the Trinity is that of differing origination, and this does not in any way imply subordination in being, work, or authority. Nothing could be plainer. The Athanasian Creed is emphatic. The Father, Son, and Spirit are “co-eternal” and “co-equal” God, and therefore indivisible in power and authority. Thus, it is asserted, “Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Spirit.”

**Calvin**

In arguing for the full divinity of Christ, Calvin says Christ “functions” as God. His divinity “is demonstrated by his works,” and his works depict him as omnipotent God. Christ governs “the universe with providence . . . by the command of his own power (Heb. 1:13).” Calvin holds that in forgiving sins, Christ “possesses not the administration merely but the actual power of the remission of sins.” Likewise, in healing the sick and raising the dead, “he [Christ] showed forth his own power.” He was “the real author of the miracles.” In appealing to the Old Testament, Calvin writes, “Christ is brought forward by Isaiah both as God and as adorned with the highest power, which is the characteristic mark of the one true God.” He is to be identified with “true Jehovah.” Later in specifically
combating the idea that the Son is eternally subordinated in authority, he says, "Whatever is of God is attributed to Christ." He rules "in majesty as King and Judge."85 The Father, Son, and Spirit create in "common" and "common also [is] the authority to command." It is beyond dispute. For Calvin, the Father, Son, and Spirit are inseparable in work or function and one in their attributes. They are indivisible in divinity, being, authority, power, and majesty.

The Confessions

The Reformation and post-Reformation confessions could not more emphatically affirm oneness in divine essence and power or being and authority among the three divine persons.

The Augsburg Confession of 1530 states, "There are three persons in this one divine essence, [are] equal in power and alike eternal."

The Belgic Confession of 1561, article 8, says, "All three [are] co-eternal and co-essential. There is neither first nor last: for they are all three one, in truth, in power, in goodness, and in mercy." The Son is neither "subordinate" nor "subservient."

The Thirty-Nine articles of the Church of England of 1563, article 1, states that "in the unity of this Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity."

The Westminster Confession of 1646, article 2, says, "in the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity."

The 1689 London Baptist confession, chapter 2 paragraph 3 speaks of "three subsistences" who are "one substance, power, and eternity."

The Methodist Articles of Religion 1784 says, "In the unity of the Godhead there are three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity."

Conclusion

Nothing in this paper should be read to question eternal divine differentiation, oneness in the one God. I write seeking to reinstate historic orthodoxy in relation to the Trinity among evangelicals. Orthodoxy makes oneness and threeness in God absolutes. I endorse this premise without any reservations. Modalism is the heresy that denies that the Father, Son and Spirit are eternally distinct "persons" yet one God. I do not do this. What this paper opposes is differentiating the divine persons on the basis of differing attributes, specifically the attribute of authority. Historic orthodoxy rejects distinguishing the divine persons on this basis because it leads inevitably to the heresies of tritheism and subordinationism.

To teach that the Son must obey the Father, and the Spirit must obey the Father and the Son, implies that each has their own will. For all eternity the Son must submit his will to the Father’s will, and the Spirit his will to the Father and the Son. Three separated "persons," each with their own will, is the error of tritheism. It is the breaching of divine unity.

If the Father is above the Son in authority and the Father and the Son above the Spirit in authority, then we have hierarchical ordering in the Trinity. The three divine persons are not coequal in power and authority. An eternal descending order of authority in the Trinity implies necessarily a descending order in divine being. The Father is omnipotent God, God in the fullness of divine being, the Son a bit less omnipotent and thus a bit less in divine being, and the Spirit a bit less again. Is this not the essence of Arianism?

Recognizing the dangers of differentiating the divine persons on the basis of differing attributes, historic orthodoxy unambiguously affirms that the Father, Son, and Spirit are one in essence/being and one in power/authority. For this reason the Evangelical Theological Society in its doctrinal statement rightly excludes those who cannot give full and unambiguous assent to the belief that the three divine persons are “one in essence, equal in power and glory.” The doctrinal statement rules that to deny this belief (or the inerrancy of the Scriptures), is to deny what is foundational to the evangelical faith.

Notes

1. This essay is substantially the same as my article “The Evangelical Theological Society and the Doctrine of the Trinity,” published in the Evangelical Quarterly 80, no. 4 (2008), 323–338, but I have made some changes to bring the essay up to date, to respond to criticisms and to make some sentences read better. I thank John Wilks, the editor of the Evangelical Quarterly, for permission to reprint this essay in revised form.

2. The words on the Trinity were added in 1990 to exclude people with a high view of inerrancy who rejected the historic doctrine of the Trinity as spelled out in the Creeds and Reformation confessions.


4. For more detail on this whole debate, see my book, Jesus and the Father: Modern Evangelicals Reinvent the Doctrine of the Trinity (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2006), What the error of “subordinationism” involves is a debate in its own right. I tracked down more than twenty definitions of the term “subordinationism” in theological dictionaries and theological texts books. The vast majority argue that this error involves ranking or hierarchically ordering the divine persons. In contrast most conservative evangelicals claim that it involves only explicitly teaching the ontological subordination of the Son.


7. The orthodox doctrine of the Trinity as summed up in the Athanasian Creed says of the divine three persons, "none is before or after, greater or lesser, all are coequal" but no one ever in the past argued that this "co-equal" understanding of the Trinity called into question aristocracy. To make the doctrine of the Trinity our social agenda is a modern error.


9. Ibid., 56.

10. Before this time theologians characteristically spoke of men as "superior" and women as "inferior."


12. This claim is simply not true. I outline the facts. 1) No one prior to 1970 ever spoke of “role” subordination. This expression comes from the post 1970s case for the permanent subordination of women. 2) No one prior to 1970, as far as I can see, has ever argued for subordination in role/function/operations and equality in being/essence/nature. Orthodoxy has held that to eternally subordinate the Son in his works implies his subordination in being.

3) Grudem quotes Charles Hodge in support but Hodge actually argues for the subordination of the Son in his “mode of subsistence and operations,” which suggests subordination in being and function (on this see my Jesus and the Father, 34–37). What Hodge teaches is not what Grudem teaches. Grudem holds that the Son is eternally subordinated in function/role not in being or subsistence. What is more B. B. Warfield, “The Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity,” in B. B. Warfield, Biblical Foundations (London: Tyndale, 1958), 109–113, argues against what Hodge teaches. All that Warfield will allow is the functional subordination of the Son in the work of redemption, i.e. a temporal voluntary subordination, which I totally accept. This is historic orthodoxy, simply using the word “function” instead of “operations” or “works.”

4) Grudem quotes other late nineteenth and early twentieth century theologians in support but none of them teach “role” subordination apart from ontological subordination and in any case quoting people who are wrong does not make something right.
21. Most egalitarian evangelicals do not appeal to the doctrine of the Trinity for the substantial equality of the sexes. I never have, and examples of this are rare. For egalitarians, the doctrine of the Trinity is our Christian doctrine of God and we believe it should not be taken as our Christian social agenda, either. For egalitarians, the doctrine of the Trinity is our Christian doctrine of God.


23. A fact I will document later.


28. Mark 1:11.

29. I will come back to this matter.


31. Grudem, Biblical Foundations, 47. The importance of this verse for this case is seen in that there are eleven references to 1 Cor.11:3 in the “Scripture References” at the back of the book, most of them discussing this verse for over a page.

32. Ibid., 49.


34. M. Harper, Equal and Different: Male and Female in the Church and Family (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1994), 121.


36. See Thistlethwaite, I Corinthians, 800–53, and many other contemporary commentators.

37. This argument is developed in stark form by Christopher Cowan, “The Father and the Son,” The Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 49, no. 1 (March 2006), 117–122. One of his many less than convincing arguments is that “the subordination” of the Son is indicated by the fact that Jesus says, “messengers are not greater than the one who sent them” (John 13:6). He seems to forget there are three possibilities: greater, equal, lesser/subordinate.


40. m. Ber. 5:5, b. B Meg. 96a, b Hag 10b, b Men. 93b, b Naz 12b, etc.


42. Frame, The Doctrine of God, 661.


44. Hanson, The Search, 103. Italics added.


46. Ibid., x. Italics added.

47. Ibid., 91.

48. Ibid., 6.

49. Ibid., 91. Italics added. For this Arian argument and Athanasius’s reply, see Athanasius, “Discourses Against the Arians,” in Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, eds., The Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, (henceforth NPNF) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), 4:3:36 (413). For all the following references to historical sources I give the reference with the page number in parentheses. Sometimes the references are not easy to locate.


51. Ibid., 4:1.18 (317).

52. Ibid., 1.10 (327).


54. When Millard Erickson, Who’s Tampering with the Trinity? (147–148) argues that Athanasius allows for the eternal subordination of the Son, he is mistaken. No one could be more consistently opposed to the subordination of the Son in the eternal life of God than Athanasius. The five references from Athanasius he quotes in support (“Four Discourses” 2:20.54, “The Synods,” 26:4, 7, 27, 28) do not prove his point. The first quote says he is not subordinate; the other four references are quotes by Athanasius of his opponents’ erroneous teaching.


56. Ibid., 2.13 (355).

57. Ibid., 2.18 (357).

58. Ibid., 3.64 (429).


63. Ibid.


66. Ibid., (227).


69. Augustine. The Trinity, 2.2.7 (101).

70. Ibid., 2.2.7 (101) and 4.5.29 (174).

71. Ibid., 2.3 (99).

72. Ibid., 2.3 (98).

73. Ibid., 1.8 (70); c.f. 2.3 (99).

74. Ibid., 2.9 (103).

75. Ibid., 5.9 (195). In 3.12 (197) he gives two lists of attributes shared by the divine three.


80. Ibid.

81. Ibid. Italics added.

82. Ibid., 1.13.9 (131).

83. Ibid., 1.13.9 (132).

84. Ibid., 1.13.24 (152).

85. Ibid., (153). Italics added.

Kevin Giles (THD) is an Australian Anglican pastor, theologian, and author. On the Trinity, he has published The Trinity and Subordinationism: The Doctrine of God and the Contemporary Gender Debate (InterVarsity, 2002), Jesus and the Father: Modern Evangelicals Reinvent the Doctrine of the Trinity (Zondervan, 2006), The Eternal Generation of the Son: Maintaining Orthodoxy in Trinitarian Theology (InterVarsity, 2012), and many articles in scholarly journals.
Combining Two Elements to Convey a Single Idea and 1 Timothy 2:12
Further Insights
Philip B. Payne

Background

The following study argues that in the ongoing crisis of false teaching in Ephesus, Paul writes, “I am not permitting a woman to seize authority to teach a man.” My original study of every instance of οὐδὲ in the Pauline corpus argued as its central thesis that the vast majority of Paul’s οὐδὲ clauses combine two elements to express a single idea. None of the responses I have seen to my original οὐδὲ study challenge this central thesis. My updated study was published in *New Testament Studies* as “1 Tim 2.12 and the Use of οὐδὲ to Combine Two Elements to Express a Single Idea,” henceforth identified as *NTS* “οὐδὲ.” It argues that in 1 Timothy 2:12, οὐδὲ combines “to teach” with “to assume authority one does not rightfully have.” As with my original study, none of the responses I have seen to my original study challenge its central thesis. Craig Blomberg writes, “Payne is already known for his parallel parts of speech conjoined with οὐδὲ, as in verse 12, create an informal hendiadys. In other words, the expressions combine to define one activity rather than two separate ones.” Blomberg supports my central thesis by identifying eleven other instances in this chapter where pairs of complementary expressions convey main points. He concludes, “This makes it overwhelmingly likely that in 1 Timothy 2:12 Paul is referring to one specific [idea].”

Following are three more reasons to conclude that the οὐδὲ clause in 1 Timothy 2:12 combines two elements to express a single idea.

1. The closest syntactical parallels join two elements to convey a single idea.

*NTS* “οὐδὲ” demonstrates that the closest syntactical parallels to 1 Timothy 2:12 clearly join two elements to convey a single idea. The closest parallel is Polybius, *Hist.* 30.5.8. Polybius’s syntax is completely parallel to 1 Timothy 2:11–12’s, including the inclusio + (1) negated finite verb + (2) infinitive + (3) οὐδὲ + (4) infinitive + (5) ἀλλὰ + (6) infinitive reiterating the inclusio. Polybius’s content after οὐδὲ clarifies that “to run in harness to Rome” is to “engage themselves by oaths and treaties [to Rome].” Together the two infinitives joined by οὐδὲ express the one idea of alliance with Rome. This one idea stands in contrast to the statement following ἀλλὰ, which affirms their openness to other alliances.

The next closest parallel to 1 Timothy 2:12’s six-part structure, Josephus, *Ant.* 7.127, also uses οὐδὲ to join two infinitives to convey a single idea that stands in opposition to the statement introduced by ἀλλὰ. The second infinitive phrase, “to keep the peace in the knowledge that their enemy was superior,” reiterates the first, “to remain quiet.” This single idea contrasts with: “Instead they sent to Chalamas [threatening the peace].” Thus, both closest structural parallels to 1 Timothy 2:12 support interpreting its οὐδὲ construction as communicating a single idea.

2. οὐδὲ almost always joins two elements to convey a single idea in the NT οὐ&ν + οὐδὲ + ἀλλὰ syntactical constructions.

The οὐ&ν + οὐδὲ + ἀλλὰ syntactical construction contrasts the content of both the οὐ&ν statement and the οὐδὲ statement to the following ἀλλὰ statement. The central core of this complex construction is a contrast between two ideas: ‘not this, but that’ (οὐ&ν . . . , ἀλλὰ . . . ). *NTS* “οὐδὲ” analyzes nine instances where Paul uses οὐδὲ to combine two elements to specify a single idea, then uses ἀλλὰ to introduce an idea in sharp contrast to this single idea: Romans 2:28–29; 9:6–7, 16; 1 Corinthians 2:6–7; Galatians 1:1, 11–12, 16–17; 4:14; and Philippians 2:16–17. There is only one clear instance in Paul’s letters where an οuada construction conveys two separate ideas that contrast with the following ἀλλὰ statement, 2 Corinthians 7:12. Yet even its two ideas form a single natural pair that united together contrasts with the ἀλλὰ clause: “I wrote not for the sake of the one who did the wrong or the one wronged but to manifest your zeal . . . .”

There is only one occurrence in the entire rest of the NT outside the Pauline letters of this οὐ&ν + οὐδὲ + ἀλλὰ construction, John 1:13. Here, οὐ&ν + οὐδὲ + ἀλλὰ join three elements that all express human birth, and ἀλλὰ contrasts all of these virtually equivalent expressions to divine spiritual birth. In light of its rareness elsewhere in the NT, it is striking that this characteristically Pauline οὐ&ν + οὐδὲ + ἀλλὰ syntactical construction occurs twice in letters whose Pauline authorship is disputed: 2 Thessalonians 3:7–8 and 1 Timothy 2:12. These characteristically Pauline constructions add to the case for their authorship by Paul. The statements joined by οὐδὲ in both these passages make best sense understood as together conveying a single idea. The contrasting “but” increases the probability that the οὐ&ν + οὐδὲ portion of the construction conveys a single idea, since ‘not this, but that’ most naturally applies to two contrasting ideas. To summarize, Paul’s overwhelmingly dominant use in οὐ&ν + οὐδὲ + ἀλλὰ syntactical constructions to convey a single idea that sharply contrasts with the following ἀλλὰ statement strongly supports this same understanding of this construction 1 Timothy 2:12.
The earliest known commentary on 1 Timothy 2:12, Origen’s, treats it as a single prohibition. After quoting 2:12, Origen describes it as “concerning woman not becoming a ruler over man in speaking” (περὶ τοῦ μὴ τὴν γυναῖκα ἡγεμόνα γίνεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ ἀνδρός). Origen’s use of “to become” (γίνεσθαι) implies entry into a position of authority over man. Origen in this context affirms Priscilla, Maximilla, the four daughters of Philip, Deborah, Miriam, Hulda and Anna, suggesting that he accepted teaching by women that was authorized.

Likewise, John Chrysostom, In epistulam ad Titum. Homilia 4.10 (PG 62.683) reconciles Titus 2:3–4 with 1 Timothy 2:12 by treating ὅνδε κυρίετεν ἀνδρός as explaining what sort of teaching he is not permitting women to do: “For this reason he [Paul] added the words ὅνδε κυρίετεν ἀνδρός, so that they [women] can instruct the young women.” Both these native Greek exegetes, who were far closer to Paul than we are, explained 1 Timothy 2:12 as a single prohibition.

“A Single Idea” Clarified

“A single idea” means one idea rather than two logically distinct ideas. When Paul writes, “There is no Jew ὅνδε Greek in Christ,” he is not conveying two ideas, first, “There is no Jew in Christ,” and second, “There is no Greek in Christ.” This can’t be what Paul means because both statements are obviously false. It is clear from the context of this statement following Paul’s denunciation of Peter treating Gentiles as second class citizens as “contrary to the gospel” (2:14) that “There is no Jew ὅνδε Greek in Christ” conveys the single idea: “there is no Jew-Greek division in Christ.” ὅνδε here joins two elements to convey one idea. Because “or” in English customarily introduces “an alternative” or “the second of two possibilities,” or “and” and “nor” do not clearly convey the meaning of ὅνδε here in Galatians 3:28 or most of the other places where it joins two elements to convey a single idea.

NTS “ὁνδὲ” explains why each passage it identifies as conveying one idea is best understood as a single idea that combines the two elements joined by ὅνδε. Its analysis shows that Paul’s use of ὅνδε as a coordinating conjunction fits into four categories:

1. ὅνδε joining two equivalent or synonymous expressions to convey a single idea,
2. ὅνδε joining naturally paired expressions to convey a single idea,
3. ὅνδε joining conceptually different expressions to convey a single idea, and
4. ὅνδε joining naturally paired ideas focusing on the same verb.

The examples in the first three categories described in NTS “ὁνδὲ” express a single idea. For example, from the first category, in Phil 2:16 refers not to two distinct activities but one expressed by synonymous parallelism: “I had not run in the race and exhausted myself for nothing” (JB). NTS “ὁνδὲ,” 243–49 consistently argues that 1 Timothy 2:12 fits category 3 and conveys “a single prohibition of women assuming authority to teach men.”

In contrast, all the passages in category four of NTS “ὁνδὲ” convey “naturally paired but clearly-distinguishable ideas focusing on the same verb.” One example is 2 Cor 7:12, “I wrote not for the sake of the one who did the wrong or the one wronged but to manifest your zeal.”

It is crucial to understand the distinction between one and two ideas because if Paul is conveying one idea through two elements, then he views those two elements together, not separately. Consequently in these cases, it is incorrect to say that he views the elements separately as negative or positive.

Does ὅνδὲ Always Join Infinitives Positive-to-Positive or Negative-to-Negative?

One aspect of NTS “ὁνδὲ” has been challenged: its rebuttal of the assertion that “the construction negated finite verb + infinitive + ὅνδε + infinitive . . . in every instance yield[s] the pattern positive/positive or negative/negative . . . I found no evidence [against this . . . This] should now be considered as an assured result of biblical scholarship and hence ought to constitute the foundation upon which a sound exegesis of the present passage [1 Tim. 2:12] is conducted.” That assertion cited no Greek grammar in support. In contrast, BDF § 445 states that the use of ὅνδε in the “conjunction of negative and positive members is, of course, admissible.”

Although that study makes its absolute assertion only regarding infinitives, it states, “Preliminary studies of ὅνδὲ taking nouns yielded results similar to those in the present study of ὅνδὲ linking verbs.” Clearly, however, in Galatians 3:28 ὅνδὲ joins “slave” and “free,” and Paul in this context explains that he regards slavery negatively and freedom positively (Gal. 4:7–9, 21–31; 5:1; cf. 1 Cor. 7:21, 23 “do not become slaves”). My original ὅνδὲ study made no mention of positive/negative pairs. NTS “ὁνδὲ” used these terms simply to respond to this absolute assertion. NTS “ὁνδὲ” identified evidence against this assertion in nine passages it appealed to for support. Its author, however, continues to assert that all these passages “conform perfectly to this pattern... The pattern is always positive/positive or negative/negative, never positive/negative or vice versa.”

Ironically, the author who coined the positive/negative terminological contrast regarding verbs joined by ὅνδὲ, criticizes “Payne’s... categorization of verbs as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ by themselves.” Yet none of my studies of ὅνδὲ identifies verbs as either positive or negative “by themselves” or “in and of themselves.” The study making this absolute assertion, however, identified verbs or the actions they describe as positive or negative “in and of themselves” eight times. Similarly, it cites with approval Blomberg’s understanding of that thesis: “Without exception these constructions pair either two positive or two negative activities.” After reading NTS “ὁνδὲ,” however, Blomberg acknowledged this pattern is not universal.

The assertion’s author’s “Rejoinder” to NTS ὅνδὲ, in contrast to his earlier analysis, no longer speaks of the usage of words “in and of themselves.” Instead, he asserts, “The pattern is always” that both verbs joined by ὅνδὲ express pairs of either “positive or negative connotation in context.” Both his earlier study and mine affirm the importance of meanings in context. What has changed is that he now asserts meaning in context in opposition to word meanings “in and of themselves.” He now states, “lexical meaning by itself is inadequate to discern
a given term’s connotation in context. A writer’s use of a given verb is to a significant extent a matter of aspect or perception and, thus, subjective.”30 By shifting the debate from lexical meaning to subjective perception, he helps shield his thesis from clear refutation. In doing so, however, he also makes any conclusions derived regarding what is negative or positive correspondingly subjective.

How do we know what is the “particular type of perception of a given activity by a writer or speaker”?31 In the case of Paul, we deduce it from the words he wrote. If a writer expresses an action with a verb that in occurrences near his time typically conveys negative connotations, this is strong evidence that he intends it to convey negative connotations. Only if the context makes it clear that he views that action positively in this context is one warranted in arguing that Paul viewed that action positively.

I applaud this sharp focus on the author’s intention in context. This focus, however, no longer permits limiting the meaning of οὐδέντευσιν in 1 Timothy 2:12 to positive authority. Focusing on the author’s intention fits beautifully with Paul’s typical use of οὐδέ to join two expressions to convey a single idea. It supports the understanding of 1 Timothy 2:12 I argue in Man and Woman, One in Christ, based squarely on the historically confirmable meaning of οὐδέντευσιν in Paul’s day, that Paul was prohibiting women from assuming without authorization authority to teach men. Paul was clearly prohibiting something. Consequently, it is natural to assume that what Paul is prohibiting he regarded as negative. I argue that 1 Timothy 2:12 prohibits a woman from teaching in combination with seizing authority over a man. If I am right, Paul was prohibiting women in Ephesus from doing exactly what the false teachers had been doing, identified in 1 Timothy 1:3, namely assuming authority without authorization to teach the assembled church.

Several factors undermine the thesis that οὐδέ always joins words that convey two activities or concepts that are both viewed positively or both viewed negatively.

1. Is it reasonable to assume that all elements οὐδέ joins are either positive or negative?

This categorization is artificial. For instance, when Paul says “there is no Jew οὐδέ Greek,” it is unlikely he was thinking of either “Jew” or “Greek” as positive or negative. He is simply denying that in Christ there is a Jew-Greek division. Authors may have intended expressions joined by οὐδέ as neutral or even a combination of positive and negative, or they may not have intended to convey the categories “positive” and “negative” at all. Even when a context permits a “positive” or “negative” meaning, it is not always clear that its author intended to convey this. The dubiousness of these categories applies to 13 of the examples cited to support this assertion.32 For example, it is not clear, that Philo, in, “For it is not necessary to fly up into heaven, nor to get beyond the sea in searching for what is good” viewed “to fly up into heaven” and “to get beyond the sea” positively33 “in and of themselves” in this context as asserted.34 Philo simply seems to be expressing in colorful language that one does not need to do extreme things to search for what is good.

The study in question asserts that since “to teach” in 1 Timothy 2:12 “is viewed positively in and of itself, ... οὐδέντευσιν should be seen as denoting an activity that is viewed positively in and of itself as well.”35 Its next paragraph, however, identifies these same infinitives as “viewed... negatively” in the case of women. This use of both “viewed positively” and “viewed negatively” for the same infinitives in the same context illustrates the challenge of assigning whether a word is “viewed positively” or “viewed negatively.”

2. When οὐδέ conveys a single idea, its component elements are not separately positive or negative.

My central point is that Paul typically used οὐδέ to combine two elements to convey a single idea. In these cases, it is the combination of these two elements that Paul viewed positively or negatively, not the two items in isolation from each other. Consequently, it is inappropriate to speak of whether he viewed them separately as positive or negative in these cases. Assertions that Paul must have regarded both elements joined by the coordinating conjunction οὐδέ separately as positive, or both negative, presupposes that Paul is conveying two ideas, not one. NTS “οὐδέ” identifies seventeen instances in Paul’s letters where οὐδέ joins expressions to convey one idea, four instances conveying two ideas, and 1 Thessalonians 2:3 as ambiguous.36 None of the four instances conveying two ideas convey ideas that are independent from one another. Rather, each of these four pairs joined by οὐδέ focuses on the same verb. Consequently, any thesis that presupposes that οὐδέ joins two independent ideas that may be categorized as “positive” or “negative” misses Paul’s predominant use of οὐδέ. Indeed, it assumes as normal something without a single clear instance in Paul’s letters.

If my thesis that οὐδέ joins two elements to convey a single idea in 1 Timothy 2:12 is correct, then what Paul prohibits in 1 Timothy 2:12 is not two separate things, “to teach” and “to assume authority without authorization” (οὐδέντευσιν), but the combination of these together: “without authorization to assume authority to teach.” It is the combination of these two things together that Paul prohibits and so, presumably, viewed negatively in this context. In some contexts he views teaching positively (e.g. 1 Tim. 4:11 “teach these things”), in some contexts negatively (e.g. Titus 1:11 “teaching what they ought not for dishonest gain”). Αὐθεντέω around the time of Paul almost always conveys something negative.37 Here, however, it is not these two things viewed separately, but the combination of them that Paul prohibits. Consequently, it is inappropriate in contexts where οὐδέ constructions convey one idea to treat each element separately as though it conveyed a positive or a negative meaning by itself.

This has two crucial implications for the thesis that οὐδέ constructions always join either positive to positive or else negative to negative. First, this thesis only properly applies when οὐδέ joins two elements to convey two ideas, for only then can one properly speak about the author’s intention for the separate elements rather than the single idea that they convey together. Thus, even if the thesis were true about passages where οὐδέ joins two separate ideas, it would not apply when οὐδέ joins elements to convey a single idea. Second, because the vast majority of Paul’s uses of οὐδέ join two elements to convey a single idea, its value, even if it were true in these cases, is limited, and especially limited in Paul’s letters.
3. Sometimes οὐδέ clearly does join an element viewed positively to one viewed negatively.

In at least three passages οὐδέ joins both a positive and a negative to another positive and negative.38 For example, Plutarch, Comparatio Aristidis et Catonis 4.2.1 states, “It is impossible for a man to do great things [positive] when his thoughts are busy with little things [negative].” Nor (οὐδέ) can he aid the many [positive] who are in need when he himself is in need of many things [negative].” These passages, in addition to the cases analyzed below where οὐδέ joins two infinitives, one with primarily positive connotations but the other with primarily negative connotations, contradict the assertion that οὐδέ “never” joins positive to negative.39

4. The “always” positive/positive or negative/negative pattern demands a meaning of ἀυθεντεῖν without clear attestation in Paul’s day.

This assertion “requires” that ἀυθεντεῖν to refer to positive authority,40 yet no scholar has ever identified any instance where the verb ἀυθεντεῖν unambiguously conveys positive authority within 300 years of Paul.41 BDAG 150 does not list “to have authority” or “to exercise authority” as a possible meanings for ἀυθεντεῖν in Paul’s day, but rather, “to assume a stance of independent authority.” Not even Baldwin’s essay on ἀυθεντεῖν in either edition of the book presenting the “always” positive/positive or negative/negative pattern, includes “to have authority” or “to exercise authority” in “the range of meanings that might be appropriate in 1 Timothy 2:12.” Instead, he narrows that range to: “to control, to dominate,” “to compel, to influence,” “to assume authority over,” and “to flout the authority of.”42 He refers to a following chapter by Schreiner that will narrow down the meaning in 1 Timothy 2:12, but Schreiner does not even make reference to any of the meanings Baldwin identifies as in “the range of meanings that might be appropriate in 1 Timothy 2:12;”43 but rather argues for another meaning “to exercise authority,”44 whose first clearly documented instance was ca. AD 370.45 Every surviving instance of ἀυθεντεῖο meaning “to assume authority, the best-documented meaning near Paul’s day, refers to authority not rightfully held.46

5. But don’t overwhelming statistics favor positive/positive or negative/negative pairs?

The author of the “always” positive/positive or negative/negative pattern wrote that he cited “102 extrabiblical parallels to 1 Tim. 2:12” that support this pattern.47 In fact, however, that study cited only 45 extrabiblical parallels, even including LXX Sirach and 1 Maccabees. NTS “οὐδέ” argues, however, that 7 of those 45 join a positive and a negative.48 Thirteen more do not clearly join positives or negatives.49 In 3 more, οὐδέ joins both a positive and a negative to another positive and negative.50 This leaves only 22 extrabiblical cases of this pattern. Furthermore, NTS “οὐδέ” 244–45, 252 argues that one of these 2251 and several of the others already excluded on other grounds52 convey a single idea, not two. This makes it doubtful their author viewed them separately as positive or negative. The significance of even this greatly-reduced number is further lessened when one considers the common use of οὐδέ to join equivalent expressions to convey a single idea and to join naturally paired expressions to convey a single idea.53 Those clearly distinguishable uses should not be used to predict the meaning of expressions that are not equivalent in meaning or natural pairs. Even if no exceptions had been identified, the number of actual instances is inadequate to sustain this thesis that οὐδέ “always” joins words that convey two activities or concepts that are both viewed positively or both viewed negatively. Crucially, the many instances where οὐδέ does join a positive idea to a negative idea prove false the allegation that there is no evidence against this thesis.

Evidence from Eight Passages against οὐδέ Always Joining Only Positives or Only Negatives

In each of the following eight passages,54 six joining two infinitives, οὐδέ joins a verb with predominantly positive connotations to a verb with predominantly negative connotations. The following analysis of these passages is more detailed than NTS “οὐδέ” provides. This analysis argues that these examples contradict the original assertion that both conjoined verbs are positive or negative in and of themselves. It also argues that the most natural reading of all but the following numbers 5, 7, and 8 contradict the redefined “pattern” asserting only that the author intended both to be viewed positively or negatively in their particular contexts. This analysis argues, however, that the author did not regard the conjoined elements of even these separately as positive or negative, but only combined together.

1) 2 Corinthians 7:12: “it was not on account of the one who did the wrong (τοῦ ἀδικήθέντος) nor (οὐδέ) on account of the one who was wronged (τοῦ ἀδικηθέντος), but in order that your zeal for us might be made known to you before God” (NRSV). Paul’s words show that he regarded “the one who did the wrong” negatively and, in this matter at least, the innocent, “wronged” party sympathetically. It is clear from 7:11 that the Corinthians repudiated the man55 who did the wrong and were sympathetic with the man56 who was wronged. “What indignation, what alarm” (7:11 NIV) shows their repudiation of the man who did the wrong, and “what affection, what concern, what readiness to see justice done” (7:11 NIV) shows their sympathy with the one wronged.

The two participial phrases joined by οὐδέ, “one who did the wrong (τοῦ ἀδικήθσαντος)” and “the one who was wronged (τοῦ ἀδικηθέντος),” identify two men, one doing wrong to the other. It is not correct to describe these participial phrases as referring to two actions, “perpetrating wrong and being victimized” and to conclude that Paul views them both negatively.57 It is obvious from Paul’s wording that he is referring to two persons and regards the “one who did the wrong” negatively, but there is no indication that Paul regarded the “wronged” man negatively. Paul’s sympathetic description of him as “the man who was wronged” (7:12) and the Corinthians’ response, “what affection, what concern, what readiness to see justice done” (7:11 NIV) support that Paul viewed him positively. Scholars like Bauer, Arndt, Gingrich,58 and Murray Harris conclude that, “probably, Paul himself was the ‘injured party.”59 Victor Paul Furnish and others have concluded that “Most commentators have identified this chief victim as the apostle himself . . . the sense of 2:5 is probably ‘not only to
me.” Similarly, Bellevue writes, “Paul is usually thought to be the [one wronged].” If this wide consensus is correct, Paul certainly did not view “the one who was wronged” negatively. Here, then, is a clear instance of οὐδὲ joining two clearly-distinguishable ideas, one referring to a man Paul views positively, the other to a man Paul views negatively.

2) 2 Thessalonians 3:6–13 is a paragraph repudiating idleness from start to finish. Nowhere in it does Paul oppose giving or receiving hospitality. The NRSV reads:

“Now we command you . . . keep away from believers who are living in idleness. . . . For you yourselves know how you ought to imitate us (μετατάξαντες ζωήν); we were not idle when we were with you, [there is no comma in Greek] and (οὐδὲ) we did not eat anyone’s bread without paying for it; but with toil and labor we worked night and day, so that we might not burden any of you. This was . . . in order to give you an example to imitate (μετατάξασθε ζωήν).” For even when we were with you, we gave you this command: Anyone unwilling to work should not eat. For we hear that some of you are living in idleness, mere busybodies, not doing any work. Now such persons we command and exhort [this sentence concludes, literally: in order that working quietly they should eat their own bread.]

Several factors support that by this οὐδὲ construction Paul is not repudiating two separate issues, idleness and eating free food, as though he opposed eating free food when it is unrelated to idleness, but is, as he typically does with this construction, repudiating the combination of both together.

First, since giving hospitality typically entails giving free food (e.g. Matt. 25:35; Rom. 12:13, 20; 2 Cor. 9:9–10), and since receiving hospitality typically entails receiving free food (e.g. Matt. 25:35), if Paul intends eating free food as a separate issue from being idle, he is repudiating hospitality. The interpretation that treats οὐδὲ here as joining two separate ideas requires that neither Paul nor his companions ate bread from anyone without paying for it and twice told his readers to imitate them in this. Yet in Philippians 4:16–19 Paul praises the Philippians for sending him aid; Romans 12:13 commands hospitality; and 1 Corinthians 10:27 commands acceptance of hospitality. Since Paul is arguing that the Thessalonians should imitate him, to interpret this οὐδὲ construction as repudiating two separate issues, idleness and eating free food, is to interpret it in way that clashes with Paul’s commands elsewhere. Furthermore, cultural convention supports that Paul and his colleagues would have shared meals without financially reimbursing each host.

Second, the “but” clause in v. 7 contrasts the entire οὐδὲ construction to: “but with toil and labor we worked night and day, so that we might not burden any of you.” The contrasting “but” clause identifies not two separate issues (idleness and eating free food) but one issue, idleness, and identifies it purpose (πρὸς BAG 717 III.3), “so that we might not burden any of you.” Furthermore, this contrast does not even mention food, which one would expect if it were a response to two separate issues. This wording, however, fits perfectly with understanding the prior οὐδὲ clause as repudiating the combination of being “idle” along with “eating without paying for it,” because it is that combination that would be a burden to them, not the two elements separately.

Third, Paul’s surrounding comments make it clear that it is the combination of idleness with eating bread freely given that Paul intends to repudiate in this context, not hospitality or the reception of hospitality viewed in isolation from idleness:

- The stated topic is “believers who are living in idleness” (v. 6).
- Verses 9–10 explicitly explain Paul’s original οὐδὲ construction “for (γὰρ) . . . anyone unwilling to work should not eat.” This is not a prohibition of hospitality or receiving freely given food. It is a prohibition of the combination of idleness and taking others’ food, namely freeloading.
- Verse 11 reiterates the problem as idleness.
- Verse 12, like the original οὐδὲ construction, combines two elements into a single command, “working quietly they should eat their own bread.” This repudiates idleness, not hospitality. It is precisely people who work for their own food who are able to share it when the need arises.

Its content and context, therefore, make it far more natural to interpret this οὐχ + οὐδὲ + ἄλλακτα construction as it almost always functions in the NT, to highlight the contrast between two ideas, not, as the translation of οὐδὲ as “or” implies, two separate ideas contrasted with a third idea. This οὐδὲ construction conveys one idea, “freeloading,” the combination of “we were not (οὐχ) idle among you and [in the sense “together with,” οὐδὲ] we did not eat anyone’s bread without compensation.” Paul immediately contrasts this with, “but (ἄλλακτα) with toil and labor we worked night and day, so that we might not burden any of you.”

To summarize, treating “eating free food” as a separate idea does not fit the explicit concern of the rest of the paragraph. Indeed, it would be irrelevant to the purpose of the paragraph. It also clashes with Paul’s explicit commands to give and to receive hospitality and with widely accepted cultural conventions. It clashes with the normal use of οὐχ + οὐδὲ clauses to convey a single idea, especially when contrasted to a single ἄλλακτα clause. Furthermore, v. 12 reiterates this single concern by combining the same two elements into a single command.

To eat food given as a gift (δῶρον) has positive connotations unless it is joined with the negative idea of idleness. Consequently, οὐδὲ here joins a negative action, to be idle, with a positive action, to eat bread freely given, contrary to the alleged pattern. All this supports interpreting οὐδὲ in 2 Thessalonians 3:7–8 as merging two ideas, one negative and one positive, to specify the single idea, freeloading.

3) Diodorus Siculus, Ἱστορίαι, 3.30.2.8 writes of historians who relate that along the borders of the Acridophagi tribe in Ethiopia “there stretches a country great in size and rich in its varied pasturage; but it is without inhabitants and altogether impossible for man to enter [since it has such] a multitude of venomous spiders and scorpions [that its former inhabitants] renounced both their ancestral land and mode of life and fled from these regions. Nor is there any occasion to be surprised at this statement or to distrust it [literally “to marvel and (οὐδὲ) to distrust these sayings”], since we have learned through trustworthy history of many things more astonishing than this which have taken place throughout all the inhabited world.” Diodorus then lists several other historical examples of animals driving people
from their homeland, including field mice in Italy, birds in Media, frogs in Illyria, and lions in Libya. He concludes, “Let these instances, then, suffice in reply to those who adopt a skeptical attitude towards histories because they recount what is astonishing.” In context, it is clear that Diodorus regards “to marvel” in a positive light, indeed, this is what makes his text interesting and explains why he writes it. What he opposes is distrusting something just because it is marvelous. He defends the truth of what sounds astonishing while opposing distrust. Consequently, he combines the two infinitives “to marvel” and “to distrust” with ὀνδὲ in order to show that it is the combination of these two infinitives together that he opposes, literally: “It is not necessary to marvel and [simultaneously] to distrust these sayings” (οὐ γὰρ δὲ θαυμάζειν ὀνδὲ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λεγομένοις). This is not a case of escalation. 65 “Distrust” is not a heightened expression of “marvel.” Nor is it a natural progression from “marvel.” Nor is “escalation” an established function of ὀνδὲ. Diodorus in this particular context clearly views “to marvel” positively and “to distrust negatively” and joins them together with ὀνδὲ. He encourages his readers to marvel but tells them not to combine this with distrust. Diodorus’s conclusion is that sometimes history is astonishing. So, once again, ὀνδὲ joins a word that in this context the author views positively to a word the author views negatively to argue against the combined single idea they convey.

4) Josephus, Ant. 15.165.3–4 states: “Hyrkanus because of his mild character did not choose either then or at any other time to take part in public affairs or (οὐδὲ, here better translated “in such a way as to” expressing that the two infinitives combine to convey one idea) start a revolution, and he submitted to Fortune and appeared to be pleased with whatever she brought about.” 66 It is clear from Josephus’s description of Hyrkanus’s varied participation in public affairs that Hyrkanus did not combine taking part in public affairs with starting a revolution. Ant. 15.179–180 summarizes Hyrkanus’s “diverse and varied” public service: “he was appointed high priest of the Jewish nation and service: “he was appointed high priest of the Jewish nation and was sleepless o’ nights (καθεύδειν). . . . [M]ost of the successes which excite the envy of others come to those who have won them as the result of painstaking, forethought, and fair conduct, and so, bending all his energies in this direction, he will put into practice his own ambitions and high aspirations, and will eradicate his listlessness and indolence (ἐξαιρεῖται).”

Similarly, Plutarch, Praecepta gerendae reipublicae 800 B states, “For you know the story that Themistocles, when he was thinking of entering upon public life, withdrew from drinking-parties and carousals; he was wakeful at night (καθεύδειν).” was sober and deeply thoughtful, explaining to his friends that Miltiades’ trophy would not let him sleep (καθεύδειν).” Likewise, Plutarch, The Life of Themistocles 3.4 (113.B) states that Themistocles “was still a young man when the battle with the Barbarians at Marathon was fought and the generalship of Miltiades was in everybody’s mouth, he was seen thereafter to be wrapped in his own thoughts for the most part, and was sleepless o’ nights (τὰς νύκτας καθεύδειν), and refused
invitations to his customary drinking parties, and said to those
who put wondering questions to him concerning his change
do not allow the conjunction of sleep and
to convey a single message that the “trophy
of the connotation of “to sleep” is interpreted
literally, since that contradicts Plutarch’s assertions that
Themistocles did sleep, or is interpreted as a metaphor meaning
“to be indolent,” since the saying would then be redundant.
So then, once again, the most natural reading is that "οὐδὲ here
conjoins an infinitive with positive connotations to an infinitive
with negative connotations to convey a single message.

6) Plutarch, Quaestiones Romanae [Aetia Romana et Graeca] 269.D: “we must not follow out τὸν ἀκριβέστατον ἀπιθμὸν διώκειν ‘to pursue, seek,’ a verb with predominantly positive connotations] the most exact calculation of the number of days nor (οὐδὲ, better translated “in conjunction with”) cast aspersions (οὐδὲ τὸ παρ’ ἀλήγον συνοφαντεῖν, a verb conveying negative assessment85) on approximate reckoning; since even now, when astronomy has made so much progress, the irregularity of the moon’s movements is still beyond the skill of mathematicians, and continues to elude their calculations.86 Nothing in this statement or its context views approximate reckoning negatively.87 Quite the opposite, Plutarch states, “we must not . . . cast aspersions on approximate reckoning.” Furthermore, Plutarch’s explanation praising the progress of astronomy shows that he regards the pursuit of exact calculations positively. His appreciation of astronomy as “a more exact science” is confirmed in Plutarch, Aristides 331.A, “We must not wonder at the apparent discrepancy between these dates [of the Athenian and Boecotian calendars], since, even now that astronomy is a more exact science, different people have different beginnings and endings for their months.”88 He opposes exact calculation in Quaestiones Romanae 269.D only because it is in combination with casting aspersions on approximate reckoning concerning an issue, the moon’s movement, that “is still beyond the skill of mathematicians.” In this case, therefore, οὐδὲ is better translated, “we must not follow out the most exact calculation of the number of days and in conjunction with this (οὐδὲ) cast aspersions on approximate reckoning.” This is another example where the context and the author’s word usage elsewhere supports understanding οὐδὲ as joining two conceptually different elements, one with positive connotations, the other negative, to convey a single message.

7) Plutarch, Quaestiones convexales 711.E.3 discusses what entertainment is appropriate at a dinner party: “Taking the cup, Diogenianus said, ‘These, too, sound like sober words to me; the wine seems not to be harming us (ἀδικεῖν) or (οὐδὲ, better translated “by” or “when it” [gets]) getting the best of us (κρατεῖν).’89 The many meanings LSJ 991 lists for κρατεῖν are clearly positive.90 Diogenianus’s comment, “These, too, sound like sober words to me,” makes clear what is also evident from the surrounding dialogue, that wine has not disturbed the clarity of their conversation. The purpose of this οὐδὲ construction is to affirm the clarity of their speech, not to make a judgment that the effects of wine are necessarily positive or negative in any broader sense. Diogenianus confirms this shortly thereafter by affirming that New Comedy is “neither too
low for the sober nor too difficult for the tipsy” (712.B.4–6), treating both sober and tipsy states with respect. Indeed, this is immediately followed with an affirmation of the effect of wine: “Excellent unaffected sentiments are an undercurrent that can melt the hardest heart and with wine to supply heat, like the smith’s fire, reshape and improve the character” (712.B.6–9).

He goes on to affirm that wine relaxes men and can improve their sexual relations with their wives in 712.B.9–C.5 and concludes “over the wine-cups, I cannot regard it as surprising to convey a single idea: the harm wine causes when it gets to our taste. “To touch” has predominantly positive connotations, and in this specific instance it highlights the positive work of smell. Nevertheless, the combination of “to touch” with the negative expression, “to give pain,” expresses a negative experience that smell prevents. Plutarch’s words show that he viewed the entire combination, “to touch and thereby give pain to the taste,” negatively and that he viewed the work of smell in preventing this positively. This usage is closely analogous to 1 Timothy 2:12, where Paul also expresses a single action he wishes to prevent by combining an infinitive with predominantly positive connotations (“to teach”) and an infinitive with predominantly negative connotations (“to assume authority one does not rightfully have”). In both cases, the following άλλα clause sharply contrasts with that single negative idea. Since Paul did not permit this combination of a woman assuming authority she did not rightfully have to teach a man in the currently ongoing situation in Ephesus, he clearly viewed this combination negatively.

Every one of these eight examples gives evidence that οὐδὲ may separate two different levels of the effect of wine, a more serious “harming us” and a less damaging “getting the better of us.” Nothing, however, in Diogenianus’s words suggests this. Furthermore, if Plutarch’s Diogenianus had intended a progression it would be far more natural for it to go from lesser to greater influence, the opposite of this order, since that is the natural progression of the effects of wine.

It is more likely that Plutarch intends Diogenianus’s combination of these two expressions to convey a single idea since both stand in contrast to “sober words.” This is why I originally wrote, “This combines negative and positive verbs to convey a single idea: the harm wine causes when it gets the best of someone.”91 The harm in view here would be a degrading of the clarity of their conversation. Diogenianus denies this is happening.

Nothing in the text implies that Plutarch regarded “harming” and “getting the best of us” as virtual synonyms.92 The overwhelmingly negative associations of “harm” and the overwhelmingly positive associations of “get the best of” count against this interpretation. Rather, in this example as in the previous ones, Plutarch seems to convey the single idea by joining a verb with negative connotations to a verb with positive connotations: “the wine seems not to be harming us by getting the best of us” in a way that would detract from clear and lively discussion of dinner party entertainment.

8) Plutarch, Bruta animalia ratione uti 990.A.11: “our sense of smell . . . [provides] a way for us to tell good food from bad. . . . our sense of smell, even before we taste, is a judge that can much more critically distinguish the quality of each article of food than any royal taster in the world. It admits what is proper, rejects what is alien, and will not let it touch or (οὐδὲ) give pain to the taste, but (άλλα) informs on and denounces what is bad before any harm is done.” Plutarch’s point is that smell prevents harm by warning against touching what is alien and thereby experiencing pain. Oὐδὲ does not convey two alternatives (touch or give pain) as though these are separate or separable actions.93 Plutarch is addressing a single issue, touch that gives pain to the taste. It combines these verbs to convey the single idea that smell prevents touch that would cause pain. In this case, it is the combination of the two elements joined by οὐδὲ into one idea, namely, “to touch and thereby give pain to the taste,” that conveys Plutarch’s single idea, an idea that sharply contrasts with the following άλλα clause. It affirms the positive work of smell in preventing things from touching and causing pain to our taste. “To touch” has predominantly positive connotations,94 and in this specific instance it highlights the positive work of smell. Nevertheless, the combination of “to touch” with the negative expression, “to give pain,” expresses a negative experience that smell prevents. Plutarch’s words show that he viewed the entire combination, “to touch and thereby give pain to the taste,” negatively and that he viewed the work of smell in preventing this positively. This usage is closely analogous to 1 Timothy 2:12, where Paul also expresses a single action he wishes to prevent by combining an infinitive with predominantly positive connotations (“to teach”) and an infinitive with predominantly negative connotations (“to assume authority one does not rightfully have”). In both cases, the following άλλα clause sharply contrasts with that single negative idea. Since Paul did not permit this combination of a woman assuming authority she did not rightfully have to teach a man in the currently ongoing situation in Ephesus, he clearly viewed this combination negatively.

Every one of these eight examples gives evidence that οὐδὲ connects a verb with primarily positive connotations to a verb with primarily negative connotations.95 As shown above, their contexts support this as the most natural reading of these passages. These examples refute the allegation that there is no evidence breaking the rule that “the construction negated finite verb + infinitive + οὐδὲ + infinitive . . . in every instance yield[s] the pattern positive/positive or negative/negative.”97

Even more important, this study reveals a remarkable pattern. In each of these passages where οὐδὲ joins an infinitive having primarily positive connotations with an infinitive having primarily negative connotations, the last six of them, the context supports that the author intended to convey a single idea.

Application of this Pattern to οὐδὲ Joining Two Elements to Convey One Idea in 1 Timothy 2:12

Similarly, in 1 Timothy 2:12, οὐδὲ joins an infinitive having primarily positive connotations, “to teach” with an infinitive having primarily negative connotations, “to assume authority one does not rightfully have.” Each of these seven instances where οὐδὲ joins an infinitive having primarily positive connotations with an infinitive having primarily negative connotations is most naturally understood as conveying a single idea, including 1 Timothy 2:12.98 This study demonstrates that when οὐδὲ joins an infinitive having predominantly positive connotations with an infinitive having predominantly negative connotations, the construction almost invariably expresses a single idea.99 This remarkably consistent pattern provides yet one more reason to interpret 1 Timothy 2:12 as combining two elements to convey a single prohibition. When οὐδὲ joins expressions to describe the abuse of something positive, like “to teach,” this pattern shows how natural it is to conjoin it with something negative, like “to seize authority.”

Conclusion

This article expands my earlier argumentation to seven key reasons 1 Timothy 2:12 should be understood as prohibiting one single idea, not two.
First, Paul typically uses οὐδέ to join two elements to convey a single idea. The only established category of οὐδέ usage in the entire Pauline corpus that makes sense of this passage joins conceptually different expressions to convey a single idea. There is not a single undisputed parallel in any of Paul’s letters where οὐδέ conveys two separate ideas by joining two such conceptually different expressions as those in 1 Timothy 2:12, “to teach” and “to assume authority one does not rightfully have.” Interpretations that treat 1 Timothy 2:12 as prohibiting two things, “to teach” and “to exercise authority over a man,” interpret οὐδέ in a way that lacks any clear syntactical parallels in any of Paul’s letters. They also appeal, apparently anachronistically, to a meaning for οὐδένεστιν that is first clearly documented ca. AD 370. Interpretations that treat this as two separate prohibitions, but the first being interpreted as “to teach a man” are syntactically even less likely. Paul’s other οὐδέ constructions strongly favor interpreting 1 Timothy 2:12 as a single prohibition of women teaching with self-assumed authority over a man.

Second, the closest syntactical parallels to 1 Timothy 2:12 join two elements to convey a single idea.

Third, in the overwhelming majority of Paul’s and the NT’s ὥς + οὐδέ + ἀλλὰ syntactical construction, which occurs in 1 Timothy 2:12, οὐδέ joins two expressions to convey a single idea in sharp contrast to the following ἀλλὰ statement.

Fourth, the earliest known commentary on 1 Timothy 2:12, Origen’s, treats it as a single prohibition, as does John Chrysostom.

Fifth is the remarkably consistent pattern that when οὐδέ conjoins an infinitive having predominantly positive connotations with an infinitive having predominantly negative connotations, the author is conveying a single idea. This indicates that 1 Timothy 2:12, too, conveys a single idea, since “to teach” has predominantly positive connotations, and “to assume authority one does not rightfully have” has predominantly negative connotations.

Sixth, this understanding only prohibited women in Ephesus from assuming authority to teach men if they did not rightfully have that authority. It did not limit teaching by women with recognized teaching authority, such as Priscilla. Priscilla instructed Apollos in Ephesus (Acts 18:24–28), the same city to which Paul gave this prohibition, and she was evidently still in Ephesus when Paul wrote 1 Timothy 2:12. It is unlikely Paul would have given a prohibition that would exclude Priscilla from teaching in the church since she was probably the best-suited person in Ephesus to correct the false teaching.

Seventh, understanding 1 Timothy 2:12 as conveying a single prohibition of a woman seizing authority to teach a man perfectly fits the theme of the letter throughout, false teaching that deceived women in particular. It also perfectly fits all the surrounding statements in the immediate context, including Paul’s explanation of the prohibition in 2:13–14. This understanding fits the text and its context lexically, syntactically, grammatically, stylistically, and theologically. It does not contradict Paul’s and the Pastoral Epistles’ affirmations of women teaching. For all these reasons, it makes sense that 1 Timothy 2:12 simply prohibited women from seizing for themselves authority to teach a man in that ongoing crisis.

Notes

1. © 2014 Payne Loving Trust. All rights reserved.
6. E.g. Andreas J. Köstenberger, “The Syntax of 1 Timothy 2:12: A Rejoinder to Philip B. Payne,” The Journal for Biblical Manhood and Womanhood 14 no. 2 (2009) 37–40, 38, “Payne’s contention that οὐδέ joins two expressions conveying a ‘single idea’ . . . may indeed be the case . . . , and I, for one, have never denied this possibility.”
9. NTS "οὐδὲ," 244–45.
10. All translations cited from the classics are from the LCL.
11. Eleven if 1 Thess. 2:3–4 is included. On any reckoning, its elements are closely interrelated, not independent ideas, and directly contrast with the immediately following ἀλλὰ statement. See NTS "οὐδὲ", 241.
12. Luke 11:33 uses οὐδεὶς instead of οὐκ, and its όὐδείς phrase is a textual variant. In Matt 5:14–15 and 9:16–17 (which also uses οὐδεὶς instead of οὐκ) the ἀλλὰ statement does not respond to the οὐκ state, only to the οὐδείς statement.
15. This can be clearly expressed in many ways in English: Jerusalem Bible, "there are no more distinctions between Jew and Greek. . . in Christ Jesus." Phillips, "Got is the distinction between Jew and Greek. . . in Christ Jesus." TEV, "there is no difference between Jews and Gentiles. . . in union with Christ Jesus." NEB, "There is no such thing as Jew and Greek. . . in Christ Jesus."
17. Köstenberger, “Complex Sentence,” 60 mistakenly says it refers to “two activities.”
18. NTS "οὐδὲ," 243–49, 248. In spite of this being the central application of the article’s theme, Andreas J. Köstenberger, “Discussion of 1 Timothy 2:12 with Philip B. Payne and Andreas J. Köstenberger,” JBMW (2010) 30, incorrectly states that Payne’s “category #3 . . . does not include 1 Tim. 2:12.” The editor of JBMW did not permit me to publish a surrejoinder to Köstenberger’s “Rejoinder.” My letters to him were significantly edited and published as a “Discussion,” without my knowledge or permission.
20. Köstenberger, “Rejoinder,” 37 incorrectly states regarding 2 Cor. 7:12, “Payne is affirming” “two corresponding aspects of the ‘one single idea.’” My analysis of this third category contradicts Köstenberger, “Rejoinder,” 38’s allegation that I “posit the presence of ‘one single idea’ or two completely
separate concepts as the only two possible alternatives." It is Köstenberger who repeatedly asserts an unrealistically narrow set of possibilities. For instance, Köstenberger, "Complex Sentence," 60 asserts, "there are only two acceptable ways of rendering [1 Tim. 2:12]: (1) 'I do not permit a woman to teach [error] or to domineer over a man,' or (2) 'I do not permit a woman to teach or to exercise authority over a man.' This excludes the possibility of ὁδηγός joining elements to convey a single idea here.


22. BDF § 445 continues, 'though it is not common in the NT. E.g., Jn 4:11 ... (ὁδηγός Ἰς)', which seems to be better Greek.' The passage BDF cites, 'You have nothing to draw with and the well is deep,' is a rare οὐδέ, DF § 445 continues, 'though it is not common in the NT. E.g., Polybius, Hist. 5.10.5; Josephus, Ant. 6.20.3–5; Plutarch, Comparatio Aristidis et Catonis 4.2.1. Köstenberger, "Complex Sentence," 64–68 numbers these examples, 9, 23, and 32.


24. Köstenberger, "Complex Sentence," 77; cf. p. 79 "without exception," p. 60 "there are only two acceptable ways of rendering that passage. . . . " p. 74 "requires."


27. Köstenberger, "Complex Sentence," 57–61, e.g. 60. "'teaching' and 'exercising authority' would be viewed positively in and of themselves."


29. http://denverseminary.monkpreview2.com/article/man-and-woman/αὐθεντέω ἀργοῦντας, which seems to be better Greek.' The passage above correctly identifies these participles as identifying "the wrongdoer" and "the injured party."


32. NTS "ὁδηγός," 240 specifically identifies 2 Cor. 7:12 as expressing "naturally paired but clearly-distinguishable ideas focusing on the same verb," as do all the passages in category four. In contrast, the examples in the first three categories described in NTS "ὁδηγός," express a single idea. Köstenberger, "Rejoinder," 37 incorrectly alleges, "Payne is affirming . . . two corresponding aspects of the 'one single idea' joined by ὁδηγός."

33. As Köstenberger, "Rejoinder," 37 states, "Paul implied that it would have been wrong for him and his associates to eat anyone's bread free of charge because doing so would have made them a 'burden' to others, which clearly has a negative connotation."

34. 1 Cor. 9:3–14 argues that Paul has a right to food and drink, but vv. 7–12 make it clear that this refers to making one's living by the gospel, a right Paul renounced since it might hinder the gospel (9:12–15). This does not imply that Paul never accepted hospitality.

35. Pace Köstenberger, "Rejoinder," 38.

36. This translates πολυπραγμονεῖν. Köstenberger, "Complex Sentence," 205 n. 13 cites LSJ 1442, "mostly in a bad sense," but LSJ cites this not for the verb πολυπραγμονεῖν in general, but just for the second of three meanings. LSJ's first, "to be busy about many things," and third meanings, "to be curious after, inquire closely into," are positive, as is the translation Köstenberger cites.


38. LSJ 16, "lie awake, pass sleepless nights . . . metaphorical to be watchful . . . vigilance."


41. LSU 852, "lie down to sleep, sleep . . . to sleep by night . . . pass the night."

42. LSJ 16, "lie awake, pass sleepless nights . . . suffers from insomnia."

43. LSU 852, "lie idle . . . to be asleep all ones life, sleep away one's life."

44. Plutarch, Pompeius 15 opposes it to "pay attention to the undertaking." Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 1157b8 opposes it to ἐνεργεῖν, "to be energetic or effective."

45. LSJ 16.


47. Köstenberger, "Rejoinder," 38.
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As the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS) celebrates sixty-five years of a blessed existence, we look back from where we came and look forward to where we shall go. But unless we can move forward with all evangelicals, our work will not survive.

As women continue to make gains in academic leadership, those at Christian institutions are often left far behind. Seminaries and other institutions that operate under religious exemption from non-discrimination laws have a long tradition of male-only education that often perpetuates itself through sexist practices. As a result, women have trouble breaking into faculty positions and influencing scholarly journals that shape the minds of peers. In the evangelical world, women have a stronghold in the church as parishioners—but not in church leadership or in the academic world. One statistic notes that 57% of evangelicals in the pews are women.2 Unfortunately, these numbers do not translate into mature women earning degrees in divinity or theology, which would form the base of ETS membership and the ranks of academia. This is not the venue to argue for the fundamental value of diversity in scholarship. There is a wealth of research that has already done that.3 Suffice it to say, “Christian universities desperately need models of godly, evangelical, intellectual womanhood.”4

The Landscape of Evangelical Women Students at Seminaries

Women make up about 34% of all graduate students in religious educational institutions5 (see Figure 1). This includes Catholic seminaries (where women are permitted to earn pontifical degrees but cannot be ordained), mainline Protestant seminaries, and many denominations in between. Evangelical seminaries, though many accept women’s ordination, lag woefully behind these numbers. By some accounts “the average percentage of female M.Div.’s at Evangelical seminaries is just 21%” (see Figure 2), nine percent lower than female enrollment at other mainline Protestant and Catholic institutions.6 Writing over twenty years ago, Catholic theologian Mary Hunt noted that when men control seminaries and women do not enter these institutions, women cannot gain access to the language of academic debate, and therefore can never enter into theological conversations. She writes, “There are still theological faculties in this country, and many places around the world, where women are not permitted to study or take advanced degrees in theology. . . . This lack of knowledge. . . results in control by those who can manipulate the jargon and concepts of the discipline to keep women as permanent outsiders.”7 Unfortunately, not much has changed in the last two decades and Hunt’s words are as easily applicable to Catholic institutions as evangelical.

For instance, the conservative Protestant Master’s Seminary motto is “we train men [sic] as if lives depended on it.”8 They do not accept women into degree programs. But even when women are “allowed” to earn theological degrees and work their way through masters and PhD programs, vocational opportunities are scarce. Women often remain a minority on faculty and can only find token employment in low-ranking positions. According to the Association of Theological Schools (ATS), which accredits religious institutions, only 18% of full professors at all seminaries, divinity schools and religious departments were women in 2011 (see Figure 3).9

The Landscape of Evangelical Women Academics in the ETS

Evangelicals suffer from a dearth of women in academia, and at every stage of the vocational academic progression more women drop out. This means that there are fewer women who identify as evangelical who might qualify and be interested in joining the ETS in the first place.

The ETS is a main artery of evangelical scholarship and networking. They self-describe as “a professional, academic society of Biblical scholars, teachers, pastors, students.”10 It connects academic evangelicals to each other, with biblical
study at the center of its mission. Since it requires that members sign a statement endorsing inerrancy and have a minimum of a Masters of Theology (ThM), it draws on a small number of academics across the country and has about 3,400 members. Of these, only 250—or seven percent of members—are female (see Figure 4).\textsuperscript{11} Clearly, the ETS is strikingly under-populated by female members despite efforts to raise the profile of women. Yet even the percent of female members seems high compared with the number of women in positions of leadership in the ETS.

In the 65 years since its inception, there has never been a female president of the Evangelical Theological Society. Of the 28 leadership positions in the society’s seven regional organizations—that of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, and Treasurer—none were held by women during 2012–2013. Some regions have steering committee members, but their names are not usually posted on the ETS website, so one cannot determine if women are represented or not. However, the Northeast Region recently posted the names of the steering committee members. I am the only woman currently serving with two men. Unfortunately, a similar dynamic is at work in the ETS journal.

In four recent issues of the journal of the ETS—the Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (JETS)—every author of an article was male (34 articles). Only 3 book reviewers were female (3/101), and only seven books reviewed were written by women (7/102). In over 237 reviews, authors, articles, and books, only ten women were represented (see Figure 5).\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, men hold all key positions at the journal.

There is not a single woman in any of the 43 editorial positions at the journal. Scholarly opportunities for female ETS members are also limited in terms of speaking opportunities at national and regional conferences. All four of the featured speakers for the theological society’s 2012 annual meeting were male and all three plenary speakers for the 2013 meeting were male as well.

The discrepancy between female participation is at odds with the sex-neutral values the ETS purports such as “oral exchange and written expression of theological thought and research.”\textsuperscript{13} With male strongholds on steering committees, leadership positions, editorial offices, and indeed, even membership and conference participation, intellectual sails can only fly at half-mast as an entire sex is absent. That is not to say that all men or all women will lead in a certain manner.

Rather, the concern is fair representation of God-created gender diversity in an organization dedicated to serving the academic pursuit of God. Yet even if women wanted to step into these positions, it would be nearly impossible to have sex-balanced steering committees, journal boards, or speakers.

Due to the sheer lack of female members in the ETS, each woman would have to be a veritable superwoman to make the presence of women represented in leadership and academic presence equal to those of men. While most organizations rely on 10% of members to do 90% of the work, female evangelicals would have to rely on virtually 100% of the women to be outputting at 100%. In contrast, hoping that 10% of the women in the ETS to take leadership positions would not even render one percent representation.

Evangelical women are increasingly attaining degrees from seminaries and doctorates in theology and religion.\textsuperscript{14} They attend conferences, and at least some are submitting reviews and books to JETS. So where are all the evangelical women teaching in the seminaries, on the membership books of the ETS, on the speaking itinerary, or in positions of leadership?

Navigating the Terrain

This question is not unique to the ETS; the lack of women in professional leadership is a concern in the business world, the academy, and beyond. But unlike the typical obstacles to professional advancement that all women face, such as discrimination, the burden of rearing children, and finding a supportive spouse, religion has been used against Christian women who work and serve in professional settings.

Many evangelical women drop out of the career race before they start because they ultimately have been told and believe that the God-ordained place of women is in the home with her children. This is exacerbated by the theological belief held by some that women cannot teach men and therefore even if a woman earns a theological degree she should not be a professor or pastor. In this situation a woman either resigns herself to a job with less prestige in an evangelical setting or abandons the evangelical academy in favor of a more supportive (usually theologically liberal) environment.

There are also logistical barriers to professional life in the evangelical academy. A two-tiered membership status in the Evangelical Theological Society makes the composition of the guild seem more balanced if one is surveying the audience at a
regional conferences. Many female students attend these local conferences, but the society does not give master’s students voting privileges or the right to present papers at national conferences. On the national level, things look much different. Graduate students have to work their way up the ranks of academia earning the minimum degree of a ThM before they can vote, present a paper, or hold office nationally. Since one needs a Masters of Divinity (MDiv) in order to get a ThM, many women are not even on track to join the ETS, choosing a non-academic degree instead.

Many evangelical women who go to seminary might opt for a Masters of Arts in Counseling—MACO—or a Masters in Religion (MAR) instead of the pastoral MDiv. Women who do earn MDiv’s often stop at the basic ministerial degree and never earn a degree that leads to full ETS membership. Even though women attend ETS meetings as students, most will not go on to earn a ThM and therefore will never have their voice heard though voting, or have their leadership skills used. Because the lowest degree attainment to become a member is a post-master’s masters or higher, there are fewer women who will qualify for ETS membership.

There are also conflicting standards for national and regional participations and this confusion prevents more female involvement. Each region determines for themselves if associate members (those without a ThM or higher) can vote, hold office, or present a paper. For instance, in the Northeast Region associate members with an MDiv can and do vote, hold office, and present papers. In contrast, “participation at the national meeting requires either full membership or an invitation from a program unit/chair.” Therefore a minimum of a ThM is needed to have an impact nationally. Regardless of the reasons for a diminished evangelical female presence in the official academic organization, edging closer to sex balance in the academy is a matter of concern to all.

Women are going to seminaries of all denominations in greater numbers than at any other time in history and are enjoying greater respect and equality in mainline Protestant branches. These women are contributing talent and diversity to their faculties. In contrast, the evangelical world is predominantly male. When only men run evangelical institutions of higher education, the minds attending these institutions are only given a partial education. With a male-saturated ETS, the multi-faceted brilliance of evangelical theology cannot shine. It is time that androcentric institutions are replaced with egalitarian structures that support the full rights and talents of the “other half” of the population.

Topographical Hope

If the ETS wants to continue to be influential, we must evaluate our current trajectory. The number of female students at evangelical seminaries is growing. Over the past 25 years, broadening ministry opportunities for women have changed the seminary landscape. . . . In 1980, women represented 6 percent of the total student population, about half of whom were auditing courses. Today, over a third of students are women pursuing a variety of ministry degrees. The ranks of female faculty members and administrators should reflect this modern change. Christian seminaries and Bible colleges represented at ETS must do more to foster a learning environment that supports women’s academic progress.

Underutilizing the expertise of trained evangelical women scholars leads to lopsided intellectual work and the dwarfing of the theological mind. While simply saying that female participation should represent sex percentage in the world would not only be unreasonable but also legalistic, fostering a learned environment that supports women’s academic advances and advancement must be more fully addressed.

Parts of the ETS are currently addressing sex inequality in several ways. In 2005, supporters from Christians for Biblical Equality (CBE) established a “Gender and Evangelicals Study Group” as a part of the ETS. Furthermore, “CBE has hosted a community dinner and a book table” at the ETS for many years. There is an additional section that convenes at the ETS annual meeting seeking to deal with issues of social minorities in the society. The “Other Voices in Biblical Interpretation” group has raised the profile of women and racial minorities in the ETS. The good work continues.

In 2010 Christians for Biblical Equality “was able to send each member of the ETS a Christians for Biblical Equality journal filled with scholarly articles . . . [and] the impact of this journal was significant.” Recent posts from the blogosphere have also addressed the sex imbalance in the ETS and encouraged greater female participation.

Right before the 2011 national meeting, Michael F. Bird pointed out that “there are about 700 hundred papers being delivered at ETS this year and only eight of them by women . . . women presenters made up only 1% of the papers at ETS.” By my count there was some improvement at the 2013 meeting, but not much. From the podium to the audience, Amanda MacInnis and Leslie Keeney rallied to get women to attend the 2012 conference. Ms. MacInnis had a mixed experience, insightfully noting, “not every Christian scholar acts like a Christian.” Yet Ms. Keeney countered this uncomfortable circumstance with the moxie that comes from being a minority sex in the ETS. Although she says women are not always welcome at the ETS, she writes, “I think I can handle a few men pursing their lips at me in disapproval.” In academic circles the need for sex equality in the ETS and the meaning of evangelicalism are also being addressed.

Last year I wrote “The Scandal of the Evangelical (Female) Mind” for The Chronicle of Higher Education noting that...
“the real scandal in Evangelical seminaries is not a lack of education—it is rather that women are not collaborating with men in the future of theological education.” This article was picked up by several blogs. JETS even published an article examining “the emerging divide in Evangelical theology.” The author, Gerald R. McDermott, rightly pointed out there is a group of evangelical theologians “who build a rigid orthodoxy on a foundation of culturally-bound beliefs because they do not realize the historical situatedness of the Bible.” McDermott notes this branch of theology “is fundamentalist in spirit because it hunts down heretics and chases them out of their ‘small tent.’” The trend towards fundamentalism is growing in the ETS and driving women and egalitarian males out of the society and into more welcoming organizations. This makes the ETS homogenized and provincial, much to our detriment. In order to keep the various strands of evangelicalism—including egalitarian and complementarian—within the ETS, generous collaboration is needed on all sides.

Creating a Cartography of Inclusion
I have not been a member of the ETS long enough to be able to track many trends, but I believe that the success or failure of female representation in the ETS and in evangelical seminaries depends on the systemic and total acceptance of women as valuable assets to theology on all fronts. This means that at home, in seminary, and in academic guilds, women must be encouraged and supported.

In the home, women who are married with children must, as COO of Facebook Sheryl Sandburg puts it, “make your partner a partner.” A lack of spousal support can have an adverse effect on a woman’s career.

In a study of well-educated professional women who had left the paid workforce...[they] specifically listed their husband’s lack of participation in child care and other domestic tasks and the expectation that wives should be the ones to cut back on employment as reasons for quitting.

Single and childfree women need support from their community and family as well. It is a great gift to the church when a woman decides to be a “eunuch for the kingdom of heaven” (Matt. 19:19) and devote her life to the study of Scripture. This should be recognized and encouraged.

In the seminary, established women in faculty and staff need to intentionally act as mentors to younger women. Opportunities that are open to all people in the ETS often require a full member to act as a sponsor. The Annual Meeting Student Scholarship Program, which “is designed to help academically promising students...who come from a traditionally underrepresented group to get to know the Society” is especially interested in female applications, but requires a nomination of the student. Likewise “associate” and “student” prospectives of the ETS require a recommendation from a full member to apply for basic membership. Who knows how many female students, women pastors with MDiv’s, or female lay theologians would join ETS if they only knew of a full member to recommend them? If there were even one go-to female faculty member at each institution, we could advance an “old-girls” club akin to the “old-boys” club that men have been privy to for years.

Finally, the ETS owes all members a certain level of respect and collegiality, regardless of personal views on women in theology and ministry. But we cannot just lean back and hope to be asked to join committees, write articles, or hold positions of leadership. In addition to a network of “go-to” women, I believe that we need to widen the base of women at each stage in career development—from student to president of a seminary—and dig the well of female academic output through active participation in the ETS. The risk, of course, is rejection, burn out, and spiritual starvation. But “many hands make light work.” In the end, it is neither a superwoman complex nor the approbation of all of our colleagues in the ETS that will determine the future of women’s involvement. We can only trust the Lord, do everything we can, and see where God brings us. “Unless the Lord builds the house, the builders labor in vain.”

Notes
1. Portions of this article were previously published in Cristina Richie, “The Scandal of the Evangelical (Female) Mind,” The Chronicle of Higher Education 59, no. 39 (2013): A37–A38.
14. Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 56, no. 2 (2013) authors: 8/8 male; 21/21 reviewers male; 19/21 books male author (one of these had a male co-author).
Christians for Biblical Equality

Christians for Biblical Equality (CBE) is an organization of Christian men and women who believe that the Bible, properly interpreted, teaches the fundamental equality of believers of all ethnic groups, all economic classes, and all age groups, based on the teachings of Scripture as reflected in Galatians 3:28.

Mission Statement

CBE affirms and promotes the biblical truth that all believers—without regard to gender, ethnicity or class—must exercise their God-given gifts with equal authority and equal responsibility in church, home and world.

Statement of Faith

• We believe the Bible is the inspired Word of God, is reliable, and is the final authority for faith and practice.
• We believe in the unity and trinity of God, eternally existing as three equal persons.
• We believe in the full deity and full humanity of Jesus Christ.
• We believe in the sinfulness of all persons. One result of sin is shattered relationships with God, others, and self.
• We believe that eternal salvation and restored relationships are possible through faith in Jesus Christ who died for us, rose from the dead, and is coming again. This salvation is offered to all people.
• We believe in the work of the Holy Spirit in salvation, and in the power and presence of the Holy Spirit in the life of believers.
• We believe in the equality and essential dignity of men and women of all ethnicities, ages, and classes. We recognize that all persons are made in the image of God and are to reflect that image in the community of believers, in the home, and in society.
• We believe that men and women are to diligently develop and use their God-given gifts for the good of the home, church, and society.
• We believe in the family, celibate singleness, and faithful heterosexual marriage as God’s design.
• We believe that, as mandated by the Bible, men and women are to oppose injustice.

To learn more about CBE’s core values, history, and ministry, visit cbe.today/info.

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